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Overview
I examine the literature on foreign aid e¤ectiveness on recipient countries
growth. Its contradictive results constitute the basis for the my investiga-
tion. I present two main models which di¤er in the information set available
to the agents that describe how the internal political constraints arising in
the presence of a special interest group interact with the e¤ects of foreign
assistance. The project is developed as follows. The opening of the thesis
presents a detailed review of the Aid E¤ectiveness Literature, with a major
focus on the third generation studies and the debate about the role the policy
environment might play in increasing the e¤ects of aid on LDCseconomic
growth. The shortcomings that commonly a¤ect the di¤erent strands of the
empirical studies are highlighted and constitute the motivational base for fu-
ture work to come. In particular I refer to the distinction between the e¤ects
due to bilateral and multilateral aid (Ram, 2003; Rajan and Subramanian,
2005) and to kinds of aid programs having di¤erent timing impact (Clemens
et al., 2004).
A lot of attention has been dedicated to analyse the impact of foreign
assistance on the growth of recipient countries, but the evidence of the dif-
ferent studies is in the end ambigous. Results can be classied in three main
strands. Some scholars argue that aid has been e¤ective in spurring growth on
average, but with diminishing returns (Hansen and Tarp,2000;20011). Other
researchers assess on the contrary that it is not possible to identify a signif-
icant relationship between aid and growth (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005).
Finally, and more recently, a third view emerged. Aid has proved to have
positive e¤ects on growth conditionally to some specic circumstances, such
as a good policy or institutional environment (Burnside and Dollar, 2000;
2004), the non tropical geographic settlement of the country (Dalgaard et al.,
2004) or the low vulnerability to shocks (Guillamont and Chauvet, 2002). I
1The amount of studies is huge. Here I only cite the most recent or inuencial ones.
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do think that before adding results to the empirical side of the research a
deeper theoretical investigation of the setting in which aid takes place is
needed in order to derive more useful and clarifying insights.
That is why the core of the present work is theoretical and serves as a
contribution to the diagnostic side of the aid research. I present a model
in which the political authorities interact with a domestic special interest
group that has an incentive to inuence policy decisions, following the path
opened by Grossman and Helpman (1994). This setting is extended to the
aid context considering the government of an aid recipient country that in-
teracts also with a donor agency. The interest of the donor in the e¤ects of
the policy implementation is direct or indirect, depending whether foreign
assistance is conditional or not on the internal policy setting. Mayer and
Mourmouras (2002) rstly analyzed these circumstances in order to describe
the advantages of conditional assistance strategies by multilateral agencies.
Departing from them the aim of the present work is to identify the di¤erent
equilibria (in terms of the combination of aid and distortion) that arise as
the solution of this non cooperative game when the hypothesis about the
cross marginal e¤ects of aid and policy distortion on welfare are allowed to
change. When an increase in aid induces a lowering of the negative e¤ect
of distortion on welfare this results less costly to bear for the government.
The space for an incentive to accept aid while implementing a worse policy
arises. The presence of internal political constraints such as the activity of
a domestic lobby group may dampen the higher e¤ectiveness of foreign aid
on the policy environment. When assistance is disbursed conditionally on
the level of distortion chosen, the possibility of a deteriorated equilibrium to
occur reduces, but in particular circumstances it might still be reached.
The results may contribute to the explanation of the ambiguity of empir-
ical results regarding the sign and signicance of the aid-policy interaction
term in growth regressions investigating the role of aid in enhancing LDCs
economic performance over time. The aggregate measures of aid commonly
used in these studies (O¢ cial Development Assistance or E¤ective Develop-
ment Assistance) do not distinguish among kinds of assistance programs that
potentially have di¤erent marginal e¤ects on the policy setting. Hence, the
results might simply be biased by the matching of non omogeneous variables.
It is interesting to note that the equilibrium combination of policy imple-
mented and aid disbursed may turn to less distorted values if new strategies
are considered. For instance, if the special interest group is somehow able
to appropriate some of the foreign assistance entering the country (its utility
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function positively depends on aid, along with the degree of distortion) the
substitution e¤ect between aid and policy distortion is reduced and this leads
to a more favourable equilibrium in terms of distortion. When aid repayment
issues are taken into account it can be observed that, even if assistance bor-
rowing is costly for the recipient country, some advantages may come from
the reduction of the possibility of worse equilibria to arise.
Finally, the basic framework is extended to a context of asymmetric in-
formation. The reforming attitude of the government is not observable by
the lobby group before setting its contribution schedule aimed at inuencing
the policy. The distortion produced in equilibrium is larger than the com-
plete information one and positively depends on the size of the distribution
over the reform consensus parameter". The more volatile the governments
preferences are, the more the special interest group has to contribute in order
to inuence political decisions, thus leading to a more distorted policy. The
presence of an additional principal, the donor agency, is then considered. Its
objective is opposite to the lobby one in terms of distortion. The donors
assistance enters directly (and linearly) into the governments welfare func-
tion. In this framework aid is considered conditional and there is no direct
e¤ect of foreign assistance on the public welfare. The burden of the con-
tribution in equilibrium results biased towards the lobby. It represents the
weak principal as its ideal distortion lies farther from the governmentone
which is equal to the donors desired distortion. The International Financial
Institution nancing aid infact is considered as purely benevolent.
The aim of this project is to shed some more light over the proper identi-
cation of incentives underlying the foreign aid structure. The analysis of the
interaction of all the actors involved: the donor agencies, the recipient coun-
triesgovernments and the domestic groups proctecting some vested interests
by actively inuencing the government allows to draw some preliminary re-
sults.
In presence of an active lobby group the fact that aid is particularly ef-
fective in promoting welfare not only directly, but also trough its e¤ect on
policies, may distort governments incentives towards a higher level of distor-
tion. In this circumstances, non trivially, if the lobby gains a special interest
over foreign aid too, the distortion in equilibrium is reduced. The presence of
asymmetric information regarding the preferences of the government towards
reforms (what I dene the "consensus parameter", that can be thought of as
well as the quality of institutions) makes distortions larger, the wider is the
size of the distribution. The uncertainty over the governments preferences is
8 CONTENTS
identied as a possible cause of the increase of the distortion in equilibrium
and though as undermining the role of the conditionality of aid.
The parameter identifying the quality of institution here is exogenous,
but the scope of further research is to endogenize it in order to design more
accurately the interconnection between institutions and policies, collective
action problem solution and nally foreign aid e¤ectiveness.
Chapter 1
Foreign aid e¤ectiveness. A
survey of the literature.
1.1 Introduction
Foreign assistance, in the sense we intend it nowadays, has been a post World
World II phenomenon. The building up of major developed countriesmulti-
lateral institutions aimed at proctecting global economic stability (IMF) or at
facing the problems of poverty in many countries of the world (World Bank)
went step by step with the idea that monetary disbursements established a
powerful instrument to overcome underdevelopment stigmata. O¢ cial strate-
gic assistance owing from industrial nations to colonized territories, com-
mercial partners or military allies is an ancient costume. What distinguishes
aid is an explicit development purpose that is by now a permanent feature
of the modern global economy.
Since the end of the 60s a large amount of attention has been dedicated
to the analysis of the e¤ects of aid on LDCseconomic growth. A common
classication, rstly introduced by Hansen and Tarp (2000), distinguishes
the works in the literature into three generationsstudies.
The earlier studies date back to the rst 70s. The core idea of the First
Generation is that aid is considered only as an exogenous net increment to
the capital stock of the recipient country. It is not treated as a component of
the national income nor as an alternative source of increase in domestic con-
sumption. The reason can be traced to the theoretical framework underlying
the analysis, the Harrod-Domar (1946) growth model. Its assumptions rely
1
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on a Leontief production function and on an excess supply of the labor in
the economy. The only engine of an increase in output is the accumulation
of capital which is the scarce factor of production. This implies production
capacity to be proportional to the capital stock. Savings, both domestic and
deriving from foreign aid, can a¤ect growth through investments that trans-
late into accumulation of physical capital. The role of aid therefore consists of
lling the gap between required investment for growth and national savings.
By the 60s, the Harrod-Domar model was already abonded as an instrument
for growth analysis, but the development strategy implications deriving from
the model were so handy that it survived as a development policy imple-
mentation instrument for a long time. From an empirical point of view the
tests to verify whether aid has a positive impact on growth concern the aid-
saving relationship from which consequently derive the core aid-investment
relationship. As Hansen and Tarp (2000) show in their survey of the First
Generation regressions, the majority of works reported evidence of a posi-
tive impact of aid on savings, but less proportional in size compared to the
amount of aid received. In the 60s Chenery and Strout (1966) extended the
Harrod-Domar model to a two-gap model, considering import capacity as
an additional constraint on growth along with the saving constraint. Since
foreign aid is supposed to equally lessen the nancial and the trade balance
gap simoultaneously, depending on which is the larger one (and binding one
for the economy), the aid-saving interaction can be positive or not. When
the trade balance gap is binding foreign assistance does not a¤ect growth
via the savings channel. One of the two gap might bind in a country with
respect to another or in one period time with respect to another inside the
same country. This observation potentially justies the "undersize" of the
saving to aid response.
The general opinion marking that period of research was indeed that aid
was e¤ective in spurring growth. A few important drawbacks, anyway, were
not taken into account. Firstly, the di¤erent empirical specications of the
aid-savings relationship carry with them distinct implications concerning the
underlying saving behaviour in the economy and this is not generally recog-
nized and explored. Secondly, and most importantly, no fungibility issues are
ever considered. Aid was thought as pouring directly into productive invest-
ment channels, but later evidence demonstrated that large amount of foreign
assistance leads to an increase in the governments consume expenditures1.
1See for example Boone (1996).
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The nancial gap approach was strongly critizised as being very naif in terms
of proper incentives for development2. From a practical perspective o¢ cial
foreign assistance reaches the recipient countries by the hands of their govern-
ments. Measuring the assistance need of a country as the di¤erence between
its required investment and its domestic source of savings implicitly force a
government willing to keep longlasting ows active to divert aid use from
saving to consumption in order to maintain the gap open and, accordingly,
the foreign source of nancing owing in.
The Second Generation studies focuses both on the investigation of the
direct relationship between aid and growth and on its indirect link via in-
vestment. Papanek (1973) initiated a stream of models in which the di¤erent
components of investment, including aid, are separated. Aid is no longer con-
sidered as a fraction of total savings, but as an isolated component a¤ecting
investments. Subsequent studies used reduced form equations on the same
line to investigate the aid-growth relationship in cross-country studies.The
results of these regressions are consistent both with the Harrod-Domar model
and with the Solow growth model. In the latter framework imput substitu-
tion is allowed while the capital-output ratio, the technology and the labour
force rates are constant over time. The growth driving factor in the short
run is still capital accumulation via investments.
Generally, these studies nd a positive link between aid and investment,
in line with the results of the First Generation. Moreover, a positive rela-
tionship between aid and growth emerged conditional on savings having a
positive e¤ect on growth. This allowed to conrm a causality direction going
from aid to savings, following up to investments and nally to growth as
standard growth models predict. Anyway, in these kind of analysis, the issue
of potential endogeneity of the results is not still explicitely addressed.
For a more accurate accounting of endogeneity we have to wait for the
Third Generation studies. This infact constitutes one of the specic char-
acteristics of this latter series of empirical works. Panel data for a wide
range of years and a great number of countries were used, allowing for better
data reliability. The underlying theoretical framework relied on the endoge-
nous growth theory. New variables measuring the quality of institutions and
economic policies were included as controls in the regressions along with pre-
viously used macroeconomic variables. In a series of studies, furthermore,
2The nancing gap approach as a base for the determination of aid necessity was widely
discussed. See Easterly (1997) for a detailed critique.
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aid was entered non-linearly in the growth regressions.
Since foreign assistance is typically distributed to poor countries in order
to help them coming out from underdevelopment one could expect a negative
link between aid and growth to be driven by the fact that lower growth
countries tend to receive more foreign assistance. This issue was already
noted in standard growth regressions for other variables measuring the state
of the economy. In order to overcome this potential endogeneity problem
most of the explanatory variables, including aid, are lagged one year. Some
studies address the problem more accurately with an instrumental variable
procedure in a two-stage least square.
The use of panel data, in all-but-one case divided in four-year periods3,
was completed to take account of country specic e¤ects and intercepts for
each year were generally included to remove any world business cycle bias.
The standard controls related to macroeconomic environment are initial
income, measured as the logarithm of real GDP per capita, which captures
convergence e¤ects and aggregate money supply as a percentage of GDP,
measured as M2/GDP and lagged one year M2/GDP, which identies the
degree of nancial depth. The measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization
proposed by Easterly and Levine (1997) and the number of assassinations
per capita are also generally included to provide specic political environ-
ment e¤ects. Di¤erent measures of the institutional and the policy set are
considered in the di¤erent studies. I will come to their description later.
The intuition of non-linear e¤ects of aid on growth is addressed in two
ways. The introduction of a squared aid term in growth regressions revealed
very forceful. Its signicance with a negative sign revealed robust across all
the studies. The presence of diminishing returns in aid appears as the most
widely accepted result of all the aid e¤ectiveness literature, being robust
to sample and controls modications. The second strategy to identify non
linearity is the inclusion of an interaction term between aid and the policy
measure which captures the potential e¤ects of aid dependent on the policy
setting.
These last generation studies can be split in two strands, according to the
signicance of this interaction term. I will concentrate the analysis on the
debate over the e¤ectiveness of aid tout-court or in the presence of a positive
policy environment.
3The only exception is the work by Guillamont and Chauvet (2001) who divide the
sample in 12-year periods.
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In general the evidence about the aid-growth link is ambiguous. However,
I can say that the majority of works tend to identify a positive and signicant
relationship, whether direct or conditional on the policy set, between aid and
growth on average.
1.2 Aid denition
The traditional measure of aid in the literature is the O¢ cial Development
Assistance (ODA)4. It comprises o¢ cial nancial ows by developed country
governments and multilateral organizations. For a lending to be o¢ cially
considered aid two features must hold. The motive of the nancing has to be
explicitely aimed at development purposes and funds have to be disbursed in
the form of grants or concessional loans. Lending is considered concessional
if, at full face value5, it has a grant element of at least 25% of the entire
disbursement. Even if the rate of interests applied to the lending are the
market ones this gives rise to subsidized loans. Often the rates are lower
than the predominant market interest rates. Indeed the loans bearing interest
rates close to commercial ones are not included in the denition of foreign aid.
The ODA measure includes both bilateral assistance, which is managed by
agencies of donor governments and multilateral assistance which is funded
by contributions from more developed countries and it is administered by
international nancial institutions, such as the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund or the United Nations Development Programme.
An alternative measure of aid introduced by Chang et al. (1999) has been
largely emploied: E¤ective Development Assistance (EDA). It di¤ers from
ODA mainly in two aspects. EDA only counts for the disbursementsgrant
component, but of all development nance. In practice, the net present value
of all the loans is considered regardless of their degree of concessionality.
In this way EDA captures only the pure transfer of resources to recipient
4In 1961, the OECD set up the Developmnet Assistance Committee, which began to
publish annual statistics on aid.
5The face value is calculated, using a 10 percent discount rate. The calculation of the
grant element is done under the assumption that loan interest rates remain constant along
the overall duration of the loan. This produces some shortcomings because prevailing
market terms are ignored, The role of currency specic market rates is not taken into
account as well as maturity di¤erentials.
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countries. Additionaly, EDAs adjusted grant equivalents are constructed
with the use of market interest rates. The ODA measures the gross resource
ow, while the EDA considers its net ow.
Futhermore, technical assistance, which is included in ODA, is excluded.
Consultants and experts working in developing countries, in the majority of
cases, are citizens of the donor countries. The reason underneath its exclusion
in the new measure is that donors benet from payments received in return
for the technical assistance supplied. On the one hand, the quid pro quo
nature of this form of assistance makes its inclusion in the net assistance
questionable. On the other hand, often the employment of foreign thechnical
personnel is due to a lack of human capital in the recipient nations. From
a theoretical point of view, the e¤ective amount of aid included in technical
assistance should be valued by considering the cost the country would bear by
hiring such skilled work on the free market. The presence of skilled foreign
personnel may play a role in the formation of human capital and transfer
of know how inside the countries. In this sense, the exclusion of technical
assistance from aid measures seems more reasonable as far as it is tied to
disbursements. Following this line of reasoning, anyway, would lead to the
exclusion of all tied aid and not only technical assistance.
EDA certainly reveals a more accurate measure when we come to make
comparisons of aid ows across donors and recipients, since ODA tend to
overestimate the aid ows to countries receiving mostly loans6. On the other
hand, aid ows of mostly grants giving donors tend to be underestimated7.
When the focus of the analysis turns to empirical studies addressing the e¤ect
of aid on growth using panel data however, since ODA and EDA are highly
correlated through time , the di¤erence in the results by the switch from one
measure to the other is not so relevant. Whatever the measurement used, the
aid value is then generally converted into constant 1985 dollars8 and divided
into real GDP from Penn World Table 5.59.
Renard and Cassimon (2003) propose a few alternative approaches to aid
6The grant elements of concessional loans are overstated especially if they are denom-
inated in the recipient countrys currency, because the related interest rates are typically
lower than 10 percent considered in the ODA measure.
7This occurs especially for donorscurrency denominated loans.
8The transformation is done using the IMFs world Export Unit Value Index.
9From Summers and Heston (1991).
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measures. They distinguish the donors perspective from the recipients per-
spective. For the donor, development assistance involves some costs. Three
ways of calculating the costs are considered. Firstly, gross budgetary costs
which derive from the face value of the loans and include gross salary paid
to technical assistance. Secondly, net budgetary costs in which net transfers
on loans and net salaries are considered. Basically, reverse nancial ows
coming from aid, such as taxes on the salaries of the donor country citizens
working as technical assistants and debt service paid by recipients on previ-
ous loans are excluded. Finally, what they dene "economic cost" takes into
account the opportunity cost of not using the resources given to development
aid in the donor economy.It is the most complete expression, but it is hardly
impossible to measure since it requires a comparison between the returns
on alternative investments and the benets donors gain from development
assistance. These range from the consolidation of trade partnerships to the
management of military threats, from the control of world political stability
to the containment of illegal migration and so on. Constructing a measure of
these benets would probably lead to more drawbacks than using the avail-
able aid measurements. From the recipients perspective aid is evaluated in
two ways. The acquisition value of aid represents the cost of obtaining the
same goods and services provided through foreign assistance on the world
market. The nal use value of aid aims at calculating the economic net
present value of projects funded with concessional loans. Evaluating each
aid component on a continous basis anyway requires huge e¤orts and it con-
sists of a non speculative procedure only on an ex post basis. Renard and
Cassimons proposals are interesting from a theoretical point of view. They
specify "what we should be measuring, and why we dont", but they are
di¢ cult to be translated into meaningful data.
1.2.1 Kind of aid
Aid appears as a very generic entity once we go into depth and understand
how many di¤erent components it encounters. The main distinction is be-
tween project aidand program aid.
Project aid involves activities over which donors try to exercise a de-
tailed and ongoing control. Aid projects generaly refer to funding for specic
investments, for instance a road or capacity building for environmental man-
agement. On average they last about three years.
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Program aid instead comprehends budget support, adjustment loans,
debt relief, and sector-wide action programs. Program aid refers to funding
given to a government to fund general public expenditures. It is usually
provided on the basis of an agreement on how money will be spent or of
specic reforms.
A third voice, however, deserves mention: "emergency aid", including
food and prime-care commodities.
Distinguishing emergency from non-emegency disbursements is easy since
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) statistics provides this informa-
tion. To distinguish non-emergency aid into project and program ows is less
straightforward. From a measurement point of view, project aid is sector-
specic while program aid is not allocable to any particular sector.
Di¤erent kinds of aid might a¤ect growth in di¤erent ways. The only
empirical study that attempt at isolating the e¤ect of di¤erent kinds of aid
is Clemens et al.(2004)10. The underlying idea is that di¤erent kind of aid
may have e¤ects on growth at di¤erent distance time. They separate aid
into three categories: emergency and humanitarian aid (very short-term),
aid that a¤ects growth only after a long period of time (long-term) and
aid that is directly aimed at a¤ecting growth within a period of four years
(short-term). Very short-term aid, like food aid, is likely to be negatively
associated with growth, since aid tends to increase fast at the same time
growth falls following an economic shock. Long-term aid, such as aid for
health, education, the environment, and democracy support may be di¢ cult
to identify in a short-run horizon. Finally, short-term aid, such as aid for
transports and infrastracture or agriculture should be the most e¤ective in
spurring growth. A strong positive relationship between the third type of aid
(which is nearly half of the overall aid) and growth emerged and proved very
robust to a variety of checks. As expected, the relationship with the other
types was less signicative. In my opinion, this seems the right direction to
10There are some previous studies that attempt at disaggregating aid ows, but they
consider assistance to a specic country or divide aid in wider categories. Owen and
Hoddinott (1999) distinguishe the e¤ects of development aid and humanitarian aid on
household welfare in Zimbabwe. Mavrotas (2002) nds that program aid, project aid and
technical assistance all had a negative e¤ect on growth in India,in the period from 1970
to 1992, while in Uganda only technical assistance had a negative impact. Gomanee et
al.(2002), analyzing the e¤ect of aid on growth in Africa, substract from ODA food and
technical assistance as they have an impact on di¤erent time-horizons. Pettersson (2004)
tries to divide aid among sectors, depending on whether aid is perceived to be fungible in
the specifc sectors and nds no di¤erence in the growth e¤ects.
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follow to obtain more sensitive and uniform results about the e¤ectiveness of
aid.
Another distinction in the overall aid has to be made. ODA includes
both multilateral and bilateral aid. Multilateral assistance is provided by
international multilateral agencies and bilateral aid is directly nanced by
the donor countries through government agencies. International Financial
Organizations are also nanced by developed countries, but the motivations
of this indirect assistance and the o¢ cial bilateral one may be very di¤erent.
Political, commercial and military interests are often at the basis of bilateral
funding. In such cases the promotion of recipient countriesgrowth is not the
core objective Some bilateral aid is tied. It is disbursed under the condition of
being used to purchase goods and services from the donor country. Aid tying
has been object of many critics. It seems to reduce the value of assistance
by about 25 percent. Because of that there has been an evident decrease
in tied aid through time in OECD countries. After a consistent amount of
foreign aid in the 70s and in the 80s, the following decade was characterized
by a sharp decrease in aid ows. The trend of aid is shown in Figure 1 for
ODA/GNI from the 60s. Most of the decline is due to bilateral aid. Fiscal
problems in OECD countries led governments to contract expenditures. Even
though foreign assistance did not represent a major component of government
spending, it was often curtailed. The end of the Cold War made the necessity
of a Western driven development less stringent. As a consequence, foreign
assistance to "buy" political allies suddenly fell. Additionally, private capital
ows directed towards developing countries sharply increased in the early
90s. Foreign investment partly compensated the needs of LDCs, but it was
concentrated in some particular countries or regions and, after the asian
nancial crisis in 1997 it started diminishing. The turndown in aid has
been reversed at the beginning of this decade. On 2nd March 2005 Paris
Declaration on Aid E¤ectiveness was held with the specic purpose of pushing
the management of aid towards a more e¤ective path in the achievement of
the Millenium Development Goals. These goals aim at cutting in half the
proportion of people living in absolute poverty within year 2015. Many
donor countries renewed their commitment to reach an amount of resources
dedicated to development assistance of 0.7% of their GNI. However, the rise
in aid ows accelerated after the 9/11 attack against the United States.
New resources dedicated to development assistance in recent years have as a
background the "war on terrorism".
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Figure 1: Long-term trend in DAC ODA-GNI ratio (1960-2004)
Source: OECD DAC ( DAC projections for the period 2006-2010)
(1.1)
While altruism can be seen as part of the intent of foreign assistance for
both multilateral and bilateral aid, the latter kind of aid is more related
to the donorsstrategic interests11. These interests may also involve posi-
tive aspects. Whatever the reasons underneath long-standing relationships
between countries (colonial past, commercial partnership, military alliance),
they often bring to some similarities in (business) language, technologies (and
related labour skills) and the legal and institutional setting which may lead
to higher returns of aid ows. The e¤ect of the di¤erent components of aid
on growth may reveal some di¤erences. Bilateral aid is typically larger than
multilateral aid. At least, it should be subject to di¤erent controls in the
analysis or, as only Ram (2003) does, it should be included in the analysis
with a di¤erent weight with respect to multilateral aid. In the following sec-
tion I describe in details the way aid-growth regressions are specied. Here I
anticipate that when the total aid variable is included in the growth regression
11See, among others, Berthelemy and Tichit (2002).
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implicitly equal weights are attached to its components (bilateral and multi-
lateral aid). Ram shows that if the two components are left unconstrained (by
entering them separatly in the regression equation12) their parameters take
values of opposite sign, suggesting that bilateral and multilateral aid play an
opposite role on growth. I postpone the discussion over the specic e¤ects
to the next section, but I wish to emphasize that further analysis would de-
serve mention on this issue. Clemens et al.(2004) and Ram (2003) show how
disaggregating aid into distinct components, di¤erent time-impact aid and
multilateral and bilateral elements, respectively, produce meaningful results
in terms of signicance of the aid variable coe¢ cient. One recent study by
Rajan and Subramanian (2005), checks for both kinds of disaggregations and
does not nd any signicant additional information with respect to the use of
total aid. Ambiguouity comes around again. I do think, anyway, that their
line of research is the one to follow in order to obtain a deeper insight into
the aid e¤ectiveness topic. The rst natural step, which will be the scope of
further research, is to jointly address the two di¤erent decompositions of aid,
by analyzing the e¤ect of di¤erent time-horizon multilateral aid on growth
and repeating the exercise for bilateral aid.
1.3 Aid and growth
1.3.1 Some general issues
The reason why the relationship between aid and growth has attracted so
much attention is due to the recognized e¤ect of economic growth in reducing
poverty and improving social indicators. When income of the poor popula-
tion rises, the opportunity to improve health, education and living standards
follows. All foreign assistance is ultimately aimed at achieving these objec-
tives.The e¤ects that aid has produced in time and across countries anyway
is far from being omogeneous.
As we briey mentioned in the introduction, in the earlier times of devel-
opment assistance, the lack of savings and foreign exchange for investment
were considered the the key responsible factors holding back poor countries.
The consequent rationale for foreign aid strategy was to lend funds to coun-
12The possibility of studying the e¤ects of the two components separately was provided
by Chang et al.(1999) database (EDA).
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tries in order to overcome a saving gapto nance necessary investment and
a trade gap so that imported machinery could be the engine of that in-
vestment. Development agencies worked with a two gap" model that made
imports and investment in physical capital the driving force of growth. The
" gap" strategy was largely implemented in the Soviet countries through
development planning, but the collapse of the system showed that invest-
ment alone does not assure growth. In the 1990s emphasis has shifted from
investment to other objectives, such as the improvement of institutions and
policies which promote growth, human capital development and technological
progress. These strategies were in line with the ndings of the new growth
theory that attempts to identify the underlying factors of growth, besides
the physical capital accumulation. The later strand of the growth litera-
ture, moreover, turned the attention to the institutional and policy setting
of a country as a major determinant of its economic performance through
time. The importance of a stable macroeconomic environment comes to
be considered essential for economic growth to take place. High ination is
bad for investment and growth (Fischer 1993). In the same way, large scal
decits delay growth (Easterly and Rebelo 1993). The openness of markets
is crucial. Most trade liberalizations accelerate growth (Sachs and Warner
1995). Fiscal, monetary, and commercial policies determine the macroeco-
nomic management level of a country and there is wide evidence that a good
macroeconomic management provides a growth-prone environment. Good
institutions and a solid economic management are important also at the mi-
croeconomic level. The strength of private property rights and of the rule
of law and the quality of the civil service a¤ect long-term growth (Knack
and Keefer 1995). Corruption in the public bureaucracy negatively a¤ects
growth (Mauro 1995).
Anyway, observing the simple relationship between aid and per capita
growth can be misleading. Some developing countries which received large
amounts of aid have grown slowly ( Zambia, for instance) while others have
grown rapidly (Ghana). Certainly, even when aid has a positive e¤ect on
growth it is not the only factor driving growth. Other variables that have an
impact on growth must be taken into account. Furthermore, countries which
experienced a poor growth are very likely to be among the ones which received
assistance. This raises the doubt that the causal relation might run from low
growth to an increase in aid, rather than in the opposite sense. It would not
be correct to interpret a negative relation, for example, as evidence that aid
reduces growth. The endogeneity problem has to explicitly addressed.
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1.3.2 Basic regressions
Before describing the main and conicting results obtained in the Aid E¤ec-
tiveness Literature I describe a representative regression of the kind used in
almost all the cross-country empirical studies.
The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of per capita GDP (g),
averaged over the benchmark period. The sample is a panel of countries
which covers an average period of 25 years13. Typically data are divided in
four-year periods. The growth rate is a function of exogenous conditions (X),
the level of policy (P), the level of aid relative to GDP (A), the level of aid
squared , and the interaction of the policy variable and aid :
g = 0 + 1X + 2P + 3A+ 4A
2 + 5A P + 6d+ u (1.2)
The coe¢ cient on the interaction term, 5, addresses the hypothesis that
the e¤ectiveness of aid depends on the policy environment, while the coe¢ -
cient on the quadratic term, 4 picks up any diminishing returns to aid. The
coe¢ cient on aid, 5, may be positive, negative or zero depending upon the
way policy inuences aid e¤ectiveness. The coe¢ cient 3 indicates the direct
e¤ect of aid on growth. The constant 0 is usually entered as a measure
of initial GDP per capita in order to capture any country xed e¤ect. The
coe¢ cient 1 gives us information about the role played by the various con-
trols in determining growth. Controls vary across the regressions or address
the same variable with di¤erent measures. I below cite the most commonly
used. In order to address the problem of endogeneity, the controls are often
lagged one period. Further on, regional dummies are entered. Typically,
Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia14 whose growth rates might be a¤ected
by common determinants of the region that , if no isolated, could bias the
coe¢ cients of the regression correlated with these same regional features. Fi-
nally, the error term (u) is entered. The standard controls most commonly
used are
- Private investments
- Government investments
13In previous studies covers the period from 1970 to 1993. In later works the sample
was expanded.
14This dummy includes fast-growing East Asian countries.
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- Domestic investments
- Government expenditures
- Private net inows
- Human capital
- Population growth rate
- Terms of trade
- Real exchange rate
- Ethno-linguistic fractionalization
- Assassinations per capita
- AssassinationsEthnic fractionalization
- Institutional quality
- Revolution
- Financial depth
- Fraction of land in the tropics
In spite of explicitly addressing endogeneity, Boone (1994) nds no re-
lationship between aid and growth, even after controlling for a range of in-
stitutional and political factors. This can be considered the initial paper of
the Third Generation of studies about aid e¤ectiveness. It comprises all the
typical features of the latter stream of analysis. In addition, its discouraging
results generated a renewal of interest for the topic. Boones stronger result
regards the positive e¤ect of aid on governments consumption to the expense
of growth-enhancing investments. He develops these results for the 1971-1990
period, suggesting that missing development was due to the fact that poverty
is not the direct consequence of the lack of stock capital. Further on, until
the beginning of the 90s aid giving was strictly related to poverty conditions
of the recipient countries and completely unrelated to changing in internal
policies. The resulting distorsive e¤ect on incentives to implement reforms
for the national authorities is nowadays well recognized. Boones analysis
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is consistent with a model setting of di¤erent political regimes searching to
maximize the utility of their supporting group, whether this is an elitarian
group, an egalitarian one or a "lassaiz-faire group" oriented to policies aimed
at reducing distortionary taxes. His ndings are in line with the framework
of an elitarian regime exploiting fungible aid to maintain political control.
All the systems support the elites at the margin, but, other things equal,
considering the basic development indicators, more libertarian governments
generate a 30% lower infant mortality rate with respect to other kinds of
governments. Boone emphasizes that, although aid does not prove e¤ective
in enhancing growth, it may bring other positive e¤ects on development.
The picture changes thanks to a very inuencial paper by Burnside and
Dollar (2000)15 in which the sample is divided between good management
and poor-management countries. The proposition that aid has no e¤ect in
the presence of weak incentives is confermed by the empirical ndings. For
countries with poor management, whatever the amount of aid, growth was
null, or negative. For countries with good management growth was posi-
tive, with size di¤erences depending on the associated amount of aid. The
group good-management and low-aid countries had an average growth of
2.2 percent per capita, while the group of good-management and high-aid
group countries grew more rapidly at 3.7. Excluding middle-income coun-
tries, which receive little aid, from the sample makes the e¤ect of aid even
stronger. Considering the growth rates in the 90s to be coherent to Burnside
and Dollars sample period, countries with "good policies" that have received
a lot of aid and experienced a good performance include Bolivia, Honduras,
Ghana and Mali. Case studies provide some specic insights. A comparative
one targeting aid e¤ectiveness in Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua com-
missioned by the Colombias Ministery of Planning supported Burnside and
Dollars conclusions. In Nicaragua, a large scal decit and high ination
rates accompanied a very poor e¤ect of aid on economic growth. In the op-
posite way, aid was largely e¤ective in Bolivia, which successfully completed
a reform program in the 1980s. The following quotation by Minister Lopez
(1997) about the three case studies reects a similar view regarding the role
of policies :
Foreign aid in itself is neutral with respect to development, for its
positive or negative e¤ects depend on government policies. Ef-
15The paper was published in 2000, but since 1997 the working paper widely circulated.
With no doubt the impact over multilateral development strategies of this study was huge.
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fects on economic development will tend to be positive when aid is
used to build up capital or to nance public investment that con-
tributes to the protability of private capital, or for human capital
development. Fiscal policy should generate governments current
savings, so that both domestic and foreign resources nance pub-
lic investment. If this does not happen, foreign resources may
end up nancing the governments current expenses and not in-
vestment projects, as happened in Nicaragua. The relationship
between aids positive e¤ects and good domestic policies always
holds, even during adjustment (Lopez 1997).
The work by Burnside and Dollar (2000) received severe critiques, but its
key role in the debate over the way aid can turn to be e¤ective for growth
deserves a deeper understanding. Firstly, we need to dene which measure
of policy was considered.
1.3.3 Policy measures
What are good policies? For their study of aid and growth, Burnside and
Dollar created a policy index based on the Sachs-Warner measure of openness,
the ination rate and the government budget surplus. By running a rst
regression of the three variables over per capita income growth they obtained
coe¢ cients that were used as the weights of the index. Their data set cover
56 aid-receiving developing countries. Growth, aid, and the other variables
are averaged over four-year periods (starting with 197073 and ending with
199093).
The choice of this policy index was strongly criticized. In general it
seemed that a sensitive measure of a good policy environment could hardly
be obtained by such a limited measure. More in the details, it was observed
that these macro focused variables are likely to be endogenous with respect
to growth.
Further studies adopt a di¤erent broad measure for the quality of pol-
icy that partially takes into account the institutional setting of a country:
the CPIA. The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment estimates the
quality of a countrys present policy and institutional framework. "Quality
refers to the extent to which a policy contributes to promote poverty reduc-
tion, sustainable growth and the e¤ective use of development assistance. The
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rating is built on a 1 to 6 scale. Since 2005 the survey are available to the
public, but as before the exact data were not published it was necessary to
use a proxy measure for the CPIA. The components of the index are divided
in four main areas, as follows:
A. Economic Management:
1. Macroeconomic Management
2. Fiscal Policy
3. Debt Policy
B. Structural Policies
4. Trade
5. Financial Sector
6. Business Regulatory Environment
C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity
7. Gender Equality
8. Equity of Public Resource Use
9. Building Human Resources
10. Social Protection and Labor
11. Policies and Institutions for
Environmental Sustainability
D. Public Sector Management and Institutions
12. Property Rights and Rule-based
Governance
13. Quality of Budgetary and
Financial Management
14. E¢ ciency of Revenue Mobilization
15. Quality of Public Administration
16.Transparency, Accountability and
Corruption in the Public Sector
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Collier and Dollar (2002) repeated Burnside and Dollars exercise using
this di¤erent measure for the quality of policy (CPIA ,1997) and considering
an alternative data set. The idea was to concentrate on the 90s to avoid
results driven from the switch in aid amounts due to the end of the Cold
War. This allowed anyway to include many more countries in the sample.
The main objective of the paper is to identify the di¤erence between an ef-
cient and the current aid allocation, but the ndings prove supportive of
the signicance of the aidpolicy interaction term. Among the controls to
capture initial conditions along with initial income also a measure of insti-
tutional quality is considered: the ICRGE from Knack and Keefer (1995).
It is an index based on the evaluations of ve di¤erent institutional indica-
tors made by the private international investment risk service, International
Country Risk Guide. In particular they are the quality of the bureaucracy,
corruption in government, rule of law, expropriation risk and repudiation of
contracts by the government. The institutional quality variable is included
as time constant. Hence, a strong assumption of constancy and exogene-
ity of institutions is needed The authors compute a regression adding an
aidinstitutions term in order to control whether the aidpolicy term might
be proxying for this variable. The aid-policy interaction term continues to
be statistically signicant and positive, suggesting a distinct role of policies
and institutions in a¤ecting returns to aid.
A di¤erent perspective is followed by Burnside and Dollar (2004). They
further expand the policy measure to embody the e¤ects of institutions. After
evaluating the di¤erent measures used in the empirical growth literature to
determine the quality of institutions16 they choose an index of institutional
quality which is computed by standardizing and averaging all the di¤erent
institutional variables used in the literature in the second half of the 90s17.
The index is showed to combine the information of the ICRG rule of law
index and the Freedom House democracy index18. By using an instrumental
variable tecnique in order to address endogeneity problems coming from the
16See Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik (1999), Acemoglu et
al.(2001), Rodrik et al. (2002) and Dollar and Kray (2003).
17See Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobotan (1999) and also Easterly and Levine (2003).
18The ICRG index ranges from 1 to 6, the higher number indicating better institu-
tions. As I mentioned before, the rule of law is one of its ve components. The Freedom
House democracy index ranges from 1 to 3, the lower number indicating more democratic
institutions.
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subjective nature of the institutional quality variables19, Burnside and Dollar
conclude that " with a new data-set covering a di¤erent period (the 1990s)
and using a di¤erent index of institutions and policies, we nd the same basic
pattern that we identied in Burnside and Dollar (2000): the combination
of good instituions/policies and external aid appears to lead to more rapid
growth".
The latter two mentioned studies somehow contradict each other. The
benchmark period of the sample is the same, but the broader measure of
policy suggests a key role of institutions in aid e¤ectiveness that was absent
in the previous study (the interaction term between institutional quality
and aid is only marginally signicant and its economic e¤ect is small and
negative). Results seem sensitive to the choice of the policy index used.
This is one of the main critiques targeted to the "conditional strand" of the
aid e¤ectiveness literature. A wider view over the main results needs to be
considered.
1.3.4 Main results
Economic and development objectives fostered by foreign aid are very di¤er-
ent. Building infrastructure, supporting sectors that prove locally produc-
tive, such as agriculture, circulating ideas and new technologies, improving
education, health and political systems, providing subsistence consumption,
especially food humanitarian crises, helping stabilize the economic systems
striken by economic shocks and so on. Despite these broader objectives for
aid, the key idea has always been that more aid is expected to lead to faster
growth. At a general level, there is no apparent simple relationship between
aid and growth. Some analysts argue that once endogeneity factors are taken
into consideration, a positive relationship emerges. Others conclude that aid
works well under certain circumstances, but has no e¤ects at all in others.
Such circumstances might be related to the policy and institutional environ-
ment, to geographical features or the economical and political setting. In this
view, while the average trend is important, the variance around the trend
and the determinants for that variance are also critical in understanding the
core underlying relationships.
19Countries which are growing faster might be rated to have good institutions.
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A lively debate animated the literature and the development strategy
circles for a long time. There is general agreement on some broad issues.
Even aid "non believers" agree that aid has been successful in some countries
(Botswana and Indonesia, for instance). It has helped to improve health by
supplying essential medical care and providing emergency relief after natural
disasters. Similarly, "aid believers" agree that a gross amount of aid has
been wasted, for example in highly corrupt political settings, such as the
Marcos regime in the Philippines. It can have adverse incentives on economic
activity. The conditions under which aid works or does not work are still a
hot topic in the development debate. Empirical evidence brings ambiguous
results. Di¤erent studies reached di¤erent ndings, depending on the time
frame, the countries involved, and the theoretical assumptions underlying
the research. Results can be divided into three main strands.
The optimistic view supports the e¤ectiveness of aid, despite recogniz-
ing its limits. Aid has a positive relationship with growth on average across
countries, but with diminishing returns as the amount of aid increases. The
most commonly reason ascribed to explain the presence of diminishing re-
turns to aid is a limited absorptive capacity by the recipient country. The
lack of adequate human capital and weak infrastructures lead to the waste
or suboptimal utilization of a part of assistance resources when the amount
disbursed increases.
The underlying idea, supported by the First generation studies, is that
aid augments saving and spurs investment. It sums up to the capital stock.
Poor countries would be unable to generate su¢ cient amounts of saving to
nance the investment required to prompt growth. The poorest countries
may even be stuck in a poverty trap in which their income is too low to
generate the saving necessary to initiate the process of sustained growth.
This is the message o¢ cially sustained by Je¤rey Sachs as Un advisor20. Aid
is argued not to prove e¤ective in spurring growth essentially because the
quantity of assistance has not been su¢ cient to induce the necessary jump
out of the poverty trap. Large amounts of aid given through time may reveal
less e¤ective than big volumes of aid properly targeted at right times. There
are di¤erent channels able to connect aid to a positive economic performance.
The endogenous growth theory gives the analytical foundation for an increase
in worker productivity driven by investments in health or education. Aid
20See Sachs et al.(2004) in the document "Ending Africas Poverty Trap" prepared in
the context of the Un Millenium Project.
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could provide a transfer of technology or knowledge from rich countries to
poor countries through technical assistance, or through direct transfer of
technologies, for instance the introduction of fertilizers in the agricultural
sector. These studies do not conclude that aid has always worked in every
country, but that on average and controlling for other factors, higher aid
leads to larger growth.
The opposite view reects results showing that aid has no signicant rela-
tionship on growth and in case it were signicative it may actually undermine
growth. This position can be traced back to Peter Bauer who was perhaps
the most inuencial supporter of this idea of development21, although he
never provided systematic empirical evidence to support his argument. Sev-
eral empirical studies draw the conclusion of no relationship between aid
and growth. Researchers have suggested di¤erent reasons to interpret their
ndings. Aid can distort incentives for private sector activities. It can spur
ination and cause a real appreciation of the domestic currency leading to
Dutch diseasee¤ects22. Hence, to the extent to which tradable activities
are a key source of productivity gains, long-term growth may su¤er. Aid
ows can prompt the augment of factors implied in the services supporting
aid projects, drawing workers and investment away from other productive
activities. Food aid, in particular, can sometimes induce a fall in prices
in the internal food production market. Furthermore, aid simply could be
wasted, enlarging governments consumption or it could augment corruption
of the bureaucratic apparatus. Aid might help keeping bad governments in
power, thus delaying reform implementation. Some argue that aid provided
to countries in conict times indirectly nances the continuation of the con-
ict, generating more instability. Hansen and Tarp, in a detailed survey of
the Aid E¤ectiveness Literature, show how the number of published empiri-
cal studies that have found no relationship between aid and growth are just
a few compared to the total number of studies. Most of them use restrictive
models, imposing a linear relationship between aid and growth and ruling
out by assumption the possibility of diminishing returns. Most also only
examine aggregate aid, implicitly assuming that all aid has a similar impact
on growth.
As I mentioned before, in the middle of the1990s researchers began to
21See Bauer (1972).
22The appreciation of the exchange rate reduces the protability of the production of
all tradable goods.
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check whether aid might support growth with diminishing returns. A large
group of studies that allow for diminishing returns have found a positive rela-
tionship. This is probably the more robust result of all the Aid E¤ectiveness
Literature. The non-linearity of the aid-growth relationship anyway were
addressed also in an alternative way, by testing for conditional relationships.
This is the last and most recent strand of research about the topic. After con-
trolling for specic variables and allowing for diminishing returns, a positive
relationship between aid and growth emerges, albeit with important variance
around the trend line. E¤ectiveness of aid may be conditional to features of
the recipient countries. This line of research was anticipated by Isham et
al.(1995) whose results showed that World Bank projects had higher rates of
returns in countries with stronger civil liberties. Burnside and Dollar (2000)
concluded that aid stimulates growth in countries with good policies. As we
discussed in the previous section, this work had a major role in prompting
many scholars to investigate aid e¤ectiveness with this new approach.
This conditionalstrand of the literature has taken into account di¤er-
ent characteristics of the recipient country that might a¤ect the aid-growth
relationship. In Table 1 the main results are summarized. The interaction
between aid and some policy variable is the most tested. I described more in
detail the di¤erent policy measures in the previous subsection. Collier and
Dehn (2001) analyze the e¤ects of large negative terms of trade shocks. They
nd that while such shocks strongly damage growth, additional aid reduces
the size of growth losses. Chauvet and Guillamont (2002) consider a wider
measure of shocks. They nd a positive coe¢ cient of the interactive term
between aid and the economic vulnerability to exogenous shocks (dened as
environment). In countries striken by climatic or external shocks aid reduces
the growth decline and allows for policy stability to be maintained. The "en-
vironment" index includes four components. The instability of agricultural
production is the proxy for climatic shocks, the smallness of the population
size for the exposure to shocks. The other two measures are the instability
of the exports earnings and the trend of the terms of trade. The index is a
weighted average of the four variables. Collier and Hoe­ er (2002) analyze a
sample of 17 countries which experienced a civil war during the rst decade
of their post-conict economic recovery. Their results lead to the observa-
tion that in the second part of the decade the absorptive capacity for foreign
assistance is systematically higher. This does not occur instead in the very
short-run (the rst three years after the conict). Finally, Dalgaard et al.
(2004) suggest that during their 30 year sample period aid resulted to be
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less e¤ective in the tropics. They do not o¤er any meaningful explanation
of the phenomenon. The negative relationship between the tropical area and
growth is a robust result in the literature (Easterly and Levine, 2003), but
also adding the aidtropical area fraction in the aid-growth regression draws
to a much more robust coe¢ cient than considering the aidpolicy interaction
term.
Study Period Signicant interaction term
Burnside&Dollar(2000) 1970-93 aidB-D policy index
Collier&Dehn(2001) 1974-93 aidB-D policy index
aidnegative shock
Guillamont&Chauvet(2002) 1970-93 aidenvironment
Collier&Dollar(2002) 1974-97 aidCPIA
Collier&Hoe­ er(2002) 1974-97 aidCPIApost-conict
Dalgaard et al.(2004) 1970-97 aidtropical area fraction
Burnside&Dollar(2004) 1990-99 aidinstitutional quality
Table 1: "Conditional" strand studies
These "conditional" studies, if relieved on, clearly have important devel-
opment policy implications. The idea that aid works better in countries with
good policies and institutions spread among donors, because this line of re-
search reects the beliefs of the majority of development operators working
on the eld. This approach can also explain the volatility of the aid e¤ects
across countries.
Unfortunately, the ndings of this strand of the literature have proved
very fragile. Their procedure relies on an interaction term between aid and
the variable considered, but many of the interaction terms are not robust
to changes in the specication. Easterly et al. (2004) nd that the original
Burnside and Dollar results are highly data dependent. They are driven by
the presence of ve outliers and they do not hold up to en enlargement of the
sample period and other robustness checks. Ram (2004) disaggregated the
aid variable into a bilateral and a multilateral component. Both kinds of as-
sistance revealed signicant coe¢ cients, although of opposite sign, but their
interaction term with the policy variable did not. These ndings suggest
that, on average, bilateral aid has been e¤ective in promoting growth, while
multilateral aid has had a negative e¤ective. This view is opposite to what
it is commonly perceived. Attempting to give an explanation for the results,
the author argues that the special link usually present between the donors
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and the recipients might have positive spill overs over aid returns. In general,
donors have quite a deep knowledge of the recipientseconomies due to his-
torical ties. This yields to the adquirance of experience and skills specic to
the recipient countries which often come along with linguistic a¢ nities and
similarities of the institutional structures. Rajan and Subramanian (2005)
repeat the exercise and do not reach the same conclusions. The works ad-
dressing the topic in the literature anyway are just a few. It would deserve
further investigation and testing.
Since the number of works in the AEL has been huge23, some economists
attempted to build a survey of the literature with the intent of comparing
the di¤erent studies by deriving omogeneous measures in terms of samples
and controls specications.
The more complete ones are Hansen and Tarp(2001), Roodman(2004),
and recently Rajan and Subramanian (2005). Roodman (2004) nds most of
the "conditional" studies to be relatively fragile. Sample variations, di¤er-
ent specication of the "conditional" variable and the inclusion of di¤erent
controls in the regressions tend to generate alternative results. Only the con-
clusions of Dalgaard and Tarp (2004) over the aid-tropic link seem robust.
Hansen and Tarp and Rajan Subramanian reach the same conclusion, but
with opposite e¤ects. The earlier study supports the idea that aid is e¤ective
in any country, despite the quality of its policies, while the more recent study
sheds a new shadow over aid e¤ectiveness. No evidence of a direct system-
atic relationship between aid and growth is found. Furthermore, no indirect
link through the geographical or policy environment is veried and even the
di¤erences in the forms of aid (bilateral vs multilateral or short-impact vs
long-impact) seem to play any role. We are back to the original question:
"Does aid really work? If not, why?"
To sum up the aid and growth research, it appears that aid has been
successful in some countries but not in others. The overall trend is a subject
of debate, the results in the literature are not omogeneous. ( although most
researchers, as a number, have found a positive relationship). The analy-
sis turned to the investigation of the conditions under which aid has the
largest impact on growth and of what types of aid are most e¤ective. The
only commonly recognized robust nding up to now seems to be that aid
23Just to mention a few more: Hadjimichael et al.(1995); Durbarry et al.(1998); Dal-
gaard and Hansen (2000); Hansen and Tarp (2000); Lensink andWhite (2001) and Clemens
et. al.(2004).
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has diminishing returns (the coe¢ cient of the aid2 term in the regressions is
negative).
I do believe that new hints coming from the growth literature could spill
over to the AEL. For instance, Rodrik (2006), commenting on the World
Banks document "Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade
of Reform" proposes a new strategy for targeting the limits of development:
" Reform e¤orts need to be selective and focus on the binding constraints on
economic growth rather than take a laundry-list approach à la Washington
Consensus...In a low-income economy, economic activity must be constrained
by at least one of the following two factors: either the cost of nance must
be too high, or the private return to investment must be low. If the problem
is with low private returns, that in turn it must be due either to low eco-
nomic (social) returns, or to a large gap between social and private returns
(low private appropriability)". The choice of the policy to be promoted in a
country should be targeted to the most binding constraint for that economy,
otherwise the positive e¤ect of the policy itself in enhancing growth could
be undermined. When investment is constrained by poor property rights,
for example, improving nancial intermediation will be of little help. When
it is constrained by the high cost of capital, improving institutional qual-
ity will not be useful. Hence, the rst step for a well-targeted development
strategy consists of undertaking a diagnostic analysis to identify the most
binding constraints on economic growth in a given setting. If policies prove
ine¤ective only because they are directed to the wrong sectors of the econ-
omy, consequently even aid given to promote such policies will turn out as
ine¤ective in spurring growth. In di¤erent settings anyway, "nancing" the
same kind of policies could be very helpful. With my analysis, I intend to
bring a further contribution to the diagnostic side of the aid literature, but
before another feature must be taken into account in order to understand all
the potential limits to proper aid e¤ectiveness.
1.4 The Principal-Agent Problem
As I said, multilateral aid is perceived to be more e¤ective than bilateral
aid. The same thing occurs for untied aid with respect to tied aid. How-
ever, the problems can be analyzed under a more general framework with
respect to the programs characteristics and the degree of internal coherence
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between their objectives and the instruments e¤ectively implied to realize
them. The donors that have large bureaucracies, that do not coordinate
with other donors, or that have poor monitoring and evaluation systems
are thought to undermine the e¤ectiveness of their aid programs. Recently,
there has been a renewed interest for an increasing country ownershipand
a broader participation of the government and the community groups in
recipient countries in choosing priorities and designing aid programs. The
problems rise both on the donor and on the recipient side.
There is only an indirect relationship between the people who provide
the funds (taxpayers in donor countries) and the beneciaries of aid projects
(the poors in recipient countries). In aid programs, there is a long and
complex chain of principal-agent relationships, starting with the taxpayers
that delegate authority to elected o¢ cials, who in turn become principals
that delegate authority to a new set of agents, the chiefs of aid agencies, who
delegate to agency employees and consultants.
In the recipient countries, there are similar relationships between citizens,
their government, those who implement programs and interest groups that
might be in favor or against the objectives of foreign assistance. The targets,
the incentives and the information of the agents involved in the development
strategies are not always in line with the objectives of the taxpayers or the
beneciaries.
The principal-agent problem characterizes all public sector agencies and
many private companies, but the international dimension and geographical
distance between the original taxpayers and the ultimate recipients amplies
the potential drawbacks. All aspects of aid delivery are a¤ected: program
design, implementation, incentives, monitoring, evaluation, and allocation of
funding. The instrument to overcome such limits is an adequate design of
the institutions. The analysis of the motivations of aid donors becomes cru-
cial for correctly dealing with the problem. In one approach, foreign aid is
determined by the economic interests of powerful groups within donors. The
idea is extended to multilateral aid by proxing for the quote of participation
to multilateral agencies by the single governments. Another view explains
aid, both bilateral and multilateral as an e¤ort to maximize benets to donor
states, deriving preferences for them from their situation in the international
system. The rst approach concentrates more on the prots from trade and
the economic gains from the access to natural resources, while the second fo-
cuses on geopolitical features. An alternative perspective sees more generally
aid as the outcome of bargaining among donor aid bureaucracies, multilateral
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aid agencies and recipient government o¢ cials.
The Principal-Agent (P-A) problems do not emerge only on the donor-
side. Recipient countries governments are often subject to the inuence
of domestic special interest groups that act against the consensus of re-
forms. Partly to overcome the P-A problem, donors often apply conditions on
aid programs to push recipients to act in accordance with donorsinterests.
Donorsconditions on recipient policies have been subject to critiques. Policy
conditionality is most often associated with the IMF and World Bank, but
all donors use conditions to some extent. The rationale for economic policy
conditions is well known: donors believe that certain policies are important
determinant for growth and development and that only through their imple-
mentation aid can have consistent positive returns. Aid has been used as a
lever for policy reforms.
The problems with conditionality can be summed up in three aspects.
First, it is di¢ cult sometimes to identify the most appropriate policy condi-
tions to ensure sustained growth. Development theories suggested di¤erent
approaches through time. In the 1950s and 1960s a state-led development
strategy was dominant. In the 1970s it was replaced by basic human needs
targets. The following decades the focus turned to a macroeconomic ap-
proach centered on trade reforms and privatizations. From the mid-90s on,
the importance of governance and institutional setting has become the core
in accordance to the new ndings of the growth literature. As a result, the
list of conditions is constantly changing. The Washington Consensus menu
of reforms greatly followed in the 1990s, for example, has been denied or
modied.
Second, imposing too many conditions or imposing none may lead to the
same results. If a proper monitoring of the policy operational path is not
undertaken or if the impositions of a large range of conditions only translates
into the implementation of the less stringent ones the e¤ects of conditionality
get lost.
Third, conditionality does not seem to work. Governments implement
reforms when it is in their interests to do so. Domestic interest groups often
inuence the governments actions more powerfully than donors do. Many
of them keep on disbursing aid even when recipients fail to meet conditions,
sometimes in a repetitive fashion. What should be an incentive instrument
for recipient is not so for donors. Their own internal incentives drive to
keep on disbursing aid to support contractors and recipients that depend on
it. Political and economic motivations mix with a Samaritans dilemma.
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Withdrawing aid would create short-term pain for the poor people it is aimed
to help24.
1.4.1 Country Ownership
Many economists argue that aid has been weakened by donor domination in
setting priorities, designing programs and implementing projects, and pro-
pose a more country ledapproach in which recipient governments take a
stronger role, or a participatoryapproach in which various groups in recip-
ient countries play a more active role. These can be considered as di¤erent
degrees of ownership of the programs. The former implies that recipient
countries take the lead in setting priorities and programs by means of their
government authorities while for the other a broad participation by the pub-
lic is required and hence, the preliminary enlargement of the consensus over
the necessity and support of reforms has to be reached within the coun-
try. The idea is to eliminate some of the problems in the long chain of the
principal-agent relationships. Di¤erent denitions of country owenership of
the programs can be found in the literature. Just to mention a few, we have
"The extent to which a country is interested in pursuing reforms
independently of any incentives provided by multilateral lenders."
[Drazen, 2002]
"A willing assumption of responsability for an agreed program
of policies by o¢ cials in a borrowing country who have the re-
sponsability to formulate and carry out the policies based on an
understanding that the program is achievable and it is in the
countrys interest" [IMF, 2001]
"The appreciation of the benets of the policies to be imple-
mented along with the adquirance of responsability for them25"
[Boughton and Mourmouras, 2001]
24See,for example Svensson (2003) and Easterly (2001).
25The words of the original denition have been slightly modied.
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"The identication with a program by a borrowing countrys top
political leadership, implementing agencies and popular consen-
sus" [Johnson and Wasty, 1991]
Ownership results in a complex issue. The di¤erence between donorsand
countriesobjectives can derive from domestic divisions over the identica-
tion of the core problems for the economy or, even when this is commonly
targeted, over the instruments to adopt to address them. The reasons may be
traced both to a simple di¤erences in the preferences of the donor agencies
and the domestic government or to limits in the information and compe-
tence available. Furthermore, political authorities may not agree internally.
Powerful political leaders might be able to overrule economic authorities and
impose their view over policy implementation. Finally, one of the main lim-
its to the enhancing of country ownership is the presence of vested interest
groups acting against country reforms. This last feature is the one I explic-
itly address in the theoretical analysis. I introduce two models in order to
analyze the internal political constraints to foreign aid assistance deriving
from the presence of a special interest group.
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Chapter 2
Internal political constraints
2.1 Introduction
The domestic political conditions of less developed countries are closely re-
lated to their policy environment. Aid can a¤ect the political setting of
countries. The other way round, internal political constraints can modify
the e¤ects of aid ows. The present analysis wishes to contribute to the
diagnosis side of theoretic aid literature. The understanding of the political
conditions under which foreign aid is disbursed acquires relevant importance
in the light of the recent debate about development strategies. Renewed im-
portance of the issue of ownership of aid programs emerged1. Ownership is
generally dened as the extent to which a country is interested in pursuing
reforms independently of any incentive provided by multilateral lenders2" .
One of the problem underneath its achievement involves the internal con-
sensus over reforms and policies to implement. The direct recipient of aid
is typically the government3. The presence of domestic lobbies protecting
their vested interests ( di¤erent from the ones of an ideal Social Planner)
is widely documented in the literature. Becker (1983) represents the semi-
nal study concerning the political inuence exerted by lobbies. Olson (1982,
1See Johnson and Martin in UNDP Human Development Report 2005.
2See Drazen (2000).
3Foreign assistance can be targeted directly to the population. ONGsprojects con-
stitute an example of this kind of aid. The majority of assistance anyway is channelled
through the government.
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1985) observed that the formation of interest groups which are favored by
the status quo is intrinsic to any process of reform. Cases of lobbying for
trade protection (Grossman and Helpman,1994), consumer and producers
taxes (Dixit, Grossman and Helpman, 1997) and innovation technology de-
lay (Krusell and Rios-Roll,1996) are present for developed countries. The
special interest (and the related rent-seeking) activity exerted for keeping
the control of natural resources (including aid) is mainly investigated in re-
lation to developing countries4 (Dalmazzo and De Blasio, 2001). Ethnic and
linguistic factors play a key function in the constituency of interest groups,
although they are often associated somehow to the control of resources.
In my analysis the internal political constraint is given by a Special In-
terest Group (SIG) that a¤ects the policy decisions of the government by
means of monetary payments. Lobbying activity plays a decisive role in the
quality of policy implemented. As a benchmark case I refer to Grossman
and Helpman (1994)5. The problem is typically dened as a principal-agent
non cooperative game. The governments objective function depends both
on the overall economic welfare and on the contribution received. It accepts
payments in exchange for the implementation of a certain degree of policy
only if its utility is at least as high as maximizing its payo¤ in absence of
contributions. The number of active lobbies inuence the amount of aggre-
gate contribution in equilibrium. When the interest groups have di¤erent
preferences over their optimal level of distortion, competition allows the gov-
ernment to receive more. The policy outcome instead is not systematically
a¤ected by the number of interest groups. For simplicity, I limit the analysis
to the presence of a single lobby. The benchmark case, indeed, sees an econ-
omy in which a certain degree of distortion is produced in equilibrium. The
aim of the work is to extend this political setting to the aid context. I con-
sider a benevolent International Financial Institution (IFI) giving assistance
to the country.
It provides aid at a market interest rate and it totally identies its utility
with the economic welfare of the country. Like Mayer and Mourmouras
(2002) I assume foreign assistance to have a positive e¤ect on welfare both
4See Boone(1996) on the negative e¤ect on growth caused by natural resources and aid
in elitist regimes and Tornell and Lane (1999) for an analysis of rent-seeking behavior by
powerful groups.
5This paper initiated the strand of political economy literature about lobbiespolicy
inuence, following the original common agency framework of Bernheim and Whinston
(1986).
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directly and indirectly through the policy. Departing from them I do not
restrict to a specic assumption. I examine the di¤erent marginal e¤ects
aid may have and the equilibrium outcomes that derive from the di¤erent
hypothesis.
The empirical literature concerning the relationship between foreign aid
and growth has reached ambiguous results along the last two decades. Schol-
ars divided into di¤erent strands depending on their ndings. The majority
of them argued that aid is e¤ective in spurring growth in Less Developed
Countries (LDCs) on average6, but with diminishing returns. Others did not
identify a signicant direct relationship between aid and growth, unless aid
is interacted with a policy variable. The most inuencial results come from
Burnside and Dollar (2000) who claim that aid has a positive e¤ect on growth
only in a good policy context. Although their work received severe critiques7
it had an enormous impact on the aid policies of multilateral donors, driving
to a switch from conditional to selective lending strategies. Finally, a few
recent works nd no robust evidence of a systematic relationship between
aid inows into a country and its economic growth8, bringing evidence back
to results already obtained in the 90s9.
The empirical literature related to the e¤ects of economic policies on
growth is instead far more omogeneous.
Considering the level of distortion produced in equilibrium by di¤erent
marginal e¤ects of aid on policies give us an idea of this indirect e¤ect of aid
on growth. I describe a formal model leading both to a positive equilibrium
in which the presence of aid plays a role in making the government able
to reduce distortions and to a negative one in which the economy ends up
in a more distorted economy compared to the case of the absence of aid.
My analysis incorporates other ndings in the literature, such as Mayer and
Mourmouras (2002) as specic cases of a more general framework.
2.2 Basic model
6See Hansen and Tarp(2001).
7See, among the others, Easterly et al.(2003) and Hansen and Tarp (2001).
8See Rajan and Subramanian (2005).
9See Boone (1996)
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The political setting of the recipient country is characterized by an econ-
omy in which the government interacts with a domestic special interest group
and an international nancial institution (IFI). Multilateral aid typically
comes with "strungs". Hence I refer to it as I am going to compare the
e¤ects of unconditional and conditional aid. However, results can as well be
addressed to bilateral assistance. Here I consider the role of a single interest
group, but the model can be extended to the presence of more lobbies. Fur-
ther more, special interest groups face serious coordination problems when
trying to exert a leverage on political decisions. I also abstract from such
issues, assuming underlying collective action problems to have been already
overcome10. The government chooses the level of "distortion" which is im-
plicit in the choice of economic policy (for example, referring to trade protec-
tion, any positive tari¤ level represents a positive degree of distortion, while
a 0 distortion would be associated to a free trade regulation). The distortion
  0 negatively a¤ects general economic welfare at an increasing rate. At
the same time, a positive level of distortion has a favorable e¤ect on the
utility of the Special Interest Group (SIG). For this reason the group has an
incentive to initiate a lobbying activity in order to inuence the decisions of
the political authorities. The members of the lobby o¤er a payment schedule
that enters directly the governments utility function. I assume that these
contributions have an e¤ect only on the welfare of the government but do not
a¤ect the overall welfare of the economy. In this sense we are implicitly con-
sidering the SIG to be external to the government. A di¤erent strand of the
literature focuses on the role played by agents who wish to inuence political
decisions from within the government.11. The governments choice of policy
also depends on the amount of nancial assistance received by the IFI. This
holds whether aid is conditional or unconditional on the policy implemented
as aid positively a¤ects the economic welfare function in any case.
Grossman and Helpman (1994) identify the conditions for the existence
of truthful equilibria in a common agency game in which domestic lobbies
o¤er contributions to the government to inuence its trade policies12. Mayer
and Mourmouras (2002) extend the analysis to the aid context. They also
10See Olson (1965) for a detailed analysis of the circumstances leading to the solution
of collective action problems.
11For example, Drazen(2001), related to the aid context.
12The seminal paper about the characterization of truthful equilibria in a common
agency game is Bernheim and Whinston (1986). Grossman and Helpman (1994) extended
this set to an economic policy environment.
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consider the possibility of aid repayment. For the moment I do not take
into account repayment issues. Aid disbursement takes the form of a grant
and bears no costs for the recipient country.Typically, IFIs give aid both in
the form of grants and of subsidized loans. In Appendix 1 I discuss how
equilibrium outcome is a¤ected by the presence of aid repayment.
The consumers and the lobby have di¤erent preferences. Aggregate wel-
fare (W ( ; A)) depends both on the welfare of the consumers(W c( ; A)) and
on the utility of the lobby(W l()). Since I consider the case of a single lobby,
its weight is very small with respect to that of the citizens.
W ( ; A) is dened as follows
W ( ; A) =
X
c
W c(A; ) +
X
l
W l() (2.1)
where c 2 [1; N ] is an index for the consumer and l 2 [1; J ] is and index
for the lobby member, since J = P   N . P is the total amount of the
population that we normalize to 1. Consumers receive an equal proportion
of welfare and the citizens who belong to the lobby equally share benets
derived from the distortion13. I can write this expression
W ( ; A) = (1  )W c(A; ) + W l(); 0 <  < 1 (2.2)
where  is the share of the population belonging to the lobby, A equals
the amount of nancial assistance disbursed, W c < 0 and W
l
 > 0.
Note that A only a¤ects the welfare of the consumers. When  is close to
0, the second term disappears and the aggregate welfare coincides with that
of the consumers, W ( ; A) = W c(A; ). Since I assume that only one lobby
is active in the economy, I rely on this simplication.
An example of  is a tari¤ on some import goods which benets the
industry producing that specic good domestically. Alternatively, it can be
seen as a scal distortion in favor of certain producers or of a part of the
population controlling some kind of resources.
13We assume that the members of the lobby group do not participate as consumers
or citizens in the aggregate welfare. This semplication does not produce any relevant
variation in the results.
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For a given ow of assistance A, the economys welfare is maximized when
there is no distortion,  = 0. The presence of the distortion has a negative
e¤ect on welfare, at an increasing rate: W < 0 and W < 0.
The governments objective function depends on economic welfare and on
the payment schedule o¤ered by the SIG:
G( ; A; a) = aW ( ; A) + C() (2.3)
where a > 0 is a parameter that identies the governments interest for
the public welfare. The parameter a identies the implicit weight attached
to the welfare of the consumers compared to the contribution. It can also
measure the quality of institutions. In this sense a only has to be positive.
Its value becomes a measure of the intensity of the governments preferences.
In the basic version of the model a is exogenous. The government accepts
assistance from the IFI becauseWA  0 , a positive level of aid has a positive
e¤ect on economic welfare. I assume that aid enhances aggregate welfare at
a decreasing rate, WA < 0.
The Special Interest Groups welfare function depends negatively on its
contribution schedule to the government (C(d)) and positively on the benets
it obtains from the economic distortion.
L() = U()  C() (2.4)
The lobbys utility function is increasing in the level of distortion at a
decreasing rate: U > 0 , U < 0.
As the distortion rises, its impact on the general welfare may generate
negative externalities that reduce the positive returns of the distortion on
the utility of the lobby. We also assume that U(0) = 0, the utility of the
lobby is null if no distortion takes place14.
Finally, the IFIs objective function is given by
14In Appendix 2 I introduce the hypothesis that the utility function of the lobby also
depends on aid. Departing from the literature I show which changes this di¤erent setting
may produce on the political equilibrium in order to capture the e¤ects of potential aid
appropriability features by the domestic lobby.
2.3. INTERNALPOLITICAL EQUILIBRIUMWITHNOFOREIGNASSISTANCE45
I( ; A) =W ( ; A)  rA (2.5)
The IFI bears a cost r > 0 for nancing aid. This parameter represents
the market interest rate at which the IFI nances its operations.
2.3 Internal political equilibrium with no for-
eign assistance
I begin the analysis by solving for the internal political equilibrium in the
absence of foreign assistance. This will serve as a benchmark that will allow
to distinguish the specic e¤ect of aid on the political setting. In these
circumstances we only need to understand how the governments decisions
about the degree of distortion to adopt is inuenced by the presence of the
lobby. The problem can be set as follows.
The lobby and the government are the actors of a non cooperative game
in two stages. In the rst period the SIG o¤ers the government a contribution
schedule C() and commits to its payment. In the second period the govern-
ment decides the level of distortion that maximizes its own welfare, taking
into account its related payment. Solving the game by backward induction
this leads to
max

aW () + C() (2.6)
that results in the following f.o.c.
aW + C = 0: (2.7)
The government will be willing to accept a contribution from the lobby
only if its welfare will result at least as large as without receiving the contri-
bution15. The government participation constraint becomes
aW ( ) + C( ) > aW (0) (2.8)
For this condition to hold a lower bound level of distortion that maximizes
G() such that C() = 0 has to exist. It follows from the previous hypothesis
15When the lobby is not active the value of the distortion for which the government
maximizes its utility is 0.
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that this value of  is equal to 0:In the rst stage the lobby determines its
contribution schedule that maximizes its welfare function, given the strategy
of the government.
max

U()  C() (2.9)
s.t. aW + C = 0 (2.10)
aW ( )+C( ) = aW (0)
(p.c.)
The participation constraint is limited to the strict equality in the lobby
problem, because the SIG has no interest in contributing the government
more than the amount that leaves it as well o¤ as if the contribution were
not received. A larger contribution schedule would not result in a credible
ex post o¤er.
As the contribution function enters linearly both in the governments wel-
fare function and in the lobbys objective function, solving (2.9) and (2.10)
together is equivalent at maximizing the joint utility of the lobby and the gov-
ernment. Following Proposition 1, p.839, in Grossman and Helpman(1994) it
can be veried that all the conditions for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) of this policy game are satised.
The combination (C;  ) identies a SPNE of the non cooperative policy
game if:
Condition 1: C 2 [0; C] , where C > 0 is the total amount of resources
available to the lobby.
When C is feasible, the lobby cannot spend more than its total resources
in nancing the government with a positive contribution.
Condition 2:   = argmax G(),   0
Given the contribution set by the SIG, the government chooses the dis-
tortion level in order to maximize its own welfare.
Condition 3:   = argmax [G() + L()];   0
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In equilibrium no resources are wasted. The equilibrium is e¢ cient, as
the joint utility of the government and the lobby is maximized.
Condition 4: 9   0 that maximizes aW ()+C() such that C() = 0
There exists a value of policy distortion that requires no contribution
from the lobby, at which the government is just as well o¤ as at  :As we
discussed above here  = 0:16
Condition 2 and 3 together imply that the contribution schedule is lo-
cally truthful around the equilibrium distortion. The intuition for truthful
contribution is that he marginal cost of contributing must be equal to the
marginal benet derived from  . This guarantees that the payment schedule
o¤ered by the lobby reects its true preferences and it is optimal ex post. If
it were not the case, commitment would not be credible.
The solution for the No Aid case (NA) is implicitly given by
U (NA) =  aW (NA) (2.11)
and, from (p.c.), the contribution in equilibrium will be
CNA(NA) = a[W (0) W (NA)] > 0 (2.12)
Here I restrict the analysis to positive values of the contribution17. The
same result must hold for the maximization problem of the lobby in equation
(). The combination (CNA(NA); NA) we have derived is the unique solution
of the non cooperative game.
We can represent governments indi¤erence curves (Gi) in a ( ; C) plane.
They are positively sloped and convex18 (see Fig.1)
16This condition is far more important in the case of two or more lobbies. It guarantees
that none of the lobby has a space for augmenting the contribution of an " in order
to induce the government to modify the policy in its favor. Until the condition is not
respecetd lobbies keep on competing eachother to make the governement choose a more
favorable policy. That is why with multiple principals the government acquires all the
surplus.
17Explicitly considering the lobby as part of the aggregate welfare also allows to analyze
the case in which the SIG is able to extract resources from the government. This ability
is proportional to the size of the lobby group.
18Their slope is @C=@ jdG=0=  aW > 0 and, since I assume that policy distortion
negatively a¤ects welfare levels at an increasing rate, we have W < 0. It follows that
@2C=@2 jdG=0=  aW > 0 so that the indi¤erence curves are positively sloped and
convex.
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The lobbys indi¤erence curves show the combination of the policy dis-
tortion and the contribution to the government, for each utility level. Since
its marginal utility is positive at a decreasing rate, they are upward-sloping19
and concave.
In equilibrium the slopes of the two indi¤erence curves must be equal:
 aW = U (2.13)
This is the solution of the game that I have already derived. As expected,
the level of the distortion in equilibrium diminishes when the government
cares more about the public welfare (political authorities need to obtain a
larger consensus), that is when a increases.20 C(NA) will equal the amount
that is enough to compensate the government from the reduction in welfare
caused by a positive distortion. As we have already discussed, the lobby has
no incentive to contribute more to the government. Thus the equilibrium
holds at the tangency point of the a lobbys indi¤erence curve, named LE,
and the lower governments contour, named G021 (L curves correspond to
higher utilities the lower they are).
19Since @C=@ jdL=0= U > 0 and @2C=@2 jdL=0= U < 0 the lobbys indi¤erence
curves are increasing and concave.
20This follows from @U=@a > 0.
21We do not allow either  or C to be negative, and we know that when  = 0, C(0) =
0. The lobby has to leave the government as better o¤ as if there were no contribution,
otherwise there is no incentive to participate in the game. In absence of contributions the
government maximizes its welfare for  = 0. Hence, the equilibrium indi¤erence curve
passes through the origin.
2.4. INTERNALPOLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM INTHEPRESENCEOFUNCONDITIONALAID49
tt NA
LE
G0
C*(t NA)
C(t ) G2
G21
L0
Figure 1: Internal political equilibrium without aid
The equilibrium contribution is derived from G0. The government in
equilibrium reaches the same utility it would get if no contribution were given,
G(NA) = aW (0). The lobbys net utility is L(NA) = U(NA)   a[W (0)  
W (NA)]:Things would be di¤erent if more than one lobby were present.
As Grossman and Helpman (1994) show, when many special interest groups
compete to inuence the government, the surplus is entirely appropriated by
the government. Because of this competition the aggregate contribution in
equilibrium is larger.
2.4 Internal political equilibrium in the pres-
ence of unconditional aid
I now consider the case in which a country receives foreign assistance which
is not conditional on the implemented policies. Aid has a positive e¤ect on
welfare and non zero e¤ects on the policy distortions. I will show that the
50 CHAPTER 2. INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
way in which aid and policy distortions interact is crucial for equilibrium
outcome.
The problem is described by a three period non cooperative game with
three actors. The aid donor moves rst and decides how much assistance to
disburse to the recipient country. After observing the amount of aid given
the lobby sets a contribution schedule to inuence the political authorities
over their policy decisions. In the last period, after aid and contribution
schedules have been set, the government chooses the level of distortion. The
di¤erent agentsobjective functions are common knowledge. As in a complete
information game à la Stackelberg, the IFI has a rst mover advantage. For
given aid, the conditions for a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium analyzed
in section 2 must still hold for the second and the third stage of the game.
The solution  (A) will be a function of the policy distortion to changes in
the aid level A.
Conditions of the previous section are modied as follows:
Condition 1: C has to be feasible: C  [0;C] , C >0:
As before, the contribution must not exceed the total amount of resources
available to the lobby.
Condition 2:for   0; A > 0;   maximizes the governments objective
function, for given aid:
  = argmax aW ( ; A) + C() (2.14)
Condition 3: for   0, A  0,   has to maximize the joint welfare of
the government and the SIG, for given aid :
  = argmax aW ( ; A) + C() + U()  C() (2.15)
Condition 4: there must exist a level of distortion that maximizes gov-
ernments objective function and that requires a null contribution.
9 = argmax aW ( ; A) + C() : C() = 0 (2.16)
Solving the maximization in Condition 2I obtain aW ( ; A)+C ( ) =
0. Substituting this result into Condition 3yields the expression for a truth-
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ful contribution22 by the lobby group: U ( ) = C ( ). From the two
expressions above we can derive the solution of the subgame between the
lobby and the government of the aid recipient country.
W (
; A) =  (1=a)U ( ) (2.17)
which implicitly denes the equilibrium level of the policy distortion as a
function of aid,  (A).
As a consequence, the optimal contribution schedule, for any given A,
becomes
C( (A)) = a[[W (0; A) W ( ; A)] (2.18)
Observe that whether the amount of the contribution is lower or higher
in the absence of foreign assistance depends on the marginal e¤ect of aid
on the distortion. When an increase in aid lowers the negative e¤ect of
distortions (WA > 0) the contribution that compensates the government
for its lost utility is lower. If aid has diminishing returns also indirectly
through the policy (WA < 0) the cost of bearing each degree of distortion
is larger. Hence a greater contribution is required to compensate the welfare
depleament.
To solve the rst stage of the game we need to specify the government
policy reaction function to changes in aid. From (2.15) we can determine its
slope:
d 
dA
(G)
=   aWA
aW + U
(2.19)
By assumption the denominator is always negative. The slope of the
policy response depends on the sign of the cross derivative WA.
A negative W cA tells us that an increase in aid reduces the marginal
e¤ect of the distortion. As the marginal e¤ect of the distortion on welfare
is negative, a rise in aid induces a stronger depleament of the economy, for
each level of distortion. Since W ( ; A) is a continous function, WA = WA .
A worsening of the distortion reduces the marginal benet of aid.
22Following Bernheim and Whinston(1986), we dene a truthful contribution schedule
as a contribution schedule that everywhere reects the true preferences of the lobby. The
S.I.G. pays to the government the excess (if any) of lobbys gross welfare at  relative to
some base level of welfare. Formally C( ;B) = max[0; U() B], for some B.
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A positive WA tells us us the opposite story. The negative e¤ect of the
policy distortion on aggregate welfare falls, as aid increases. In practice a
rise in aid decreases the rate at which policy distortions deteriorate economic
welfare. This hypothesis can t to distortions like high decit. An increase
in aid may relax the governments budget constraint and make the distortion
less costly.
Foreign assistance takes many di¤erent forms and might produce di¤erent
kinds of spillovers on the policy environment. One hypothesis could be better
applied to certain circumstances and the opposite to others. For the sake of
generality we will characterize the equilibria in both cases and we will focus
on their di¤erences to describe a possible reason for the ambiguouity of results
obtained by the empirical literature on the e¤ect of aid on growth.
In order to identify the equilibrium levels of foreign assistance and policy
distortion, and consequently of the lobbys contribution, we must describe
the IFIs welfare contours. Their slope is given by
d
dA
(I)
=  WA   r
W
(2.20)
where the denominator is always negative and WA is always positive.
When W cA > r, which occurs for lower values of A, the slope of the IFIs
objective funtion is positive. When WA < r, for higher values of A, it is
negative.
As W ( ; A) is increasing in A, with diminishing returns, the highest wel-
fare countour of the IFI reduces to a point when d equals 0: IFIs utility
reduces as its countour curves lie farther from the A axis. The condition
W cA = [r=(1 )] implicitly identies a function (A) which constitutes the
set of points where the indi¤erence curvesslope change.23 When an increase
in foreign assistance has a stronger e¤ect in improving welfare compared to
the marginal cost of nancing it, the combination of both larger values at
 and aid give rise to the same amount of utility for the IFI (the slope is
positive). The slope is negative, instead, (that is, higher values of the distor-
tion are associated to lower values of assistance) when the marginal benet
of aid on economic welfare (WA) is lower than the marginal cost of nancing
aid (r). This occurs for lower values of aid as aid has decreasing returns. In
23This function is dened by the combination of  and A correspondent to the highest
level of distortion for each level of the IFIs welfare. As an increase in  , for given A,
makes the IFIs welfare decline we can draw conclusions about the concavity of the map
of the welfare contours without calculating its expression.
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Figure 2 we draw examples of possible equilibria. For a matter of compari-
son to the the benchmark and the conditional case we invert the axes with
respect to expressions (2:17) and (2:18). Policy response function is depicted
as line for simplicity. It has to pass through NA since, when no aid is given,
the political game leads to that amount of distortion. Their concavity might
change, but the sign of their slope never is always whether positive or neg-
ative, depending on the sign of WA.Graphically the equilibrium is reached
when the governments reaction function is tangent to an IFIs welfare con-
tour. Their slopes will have the same value in that point, though we can
rewrite the equilibrium condition as
  aWA
aW + U
=  W
c
A   r
W
(2.21)
This expression implicitly denes the equilibrium combination ( (A); A).
The corresponding optimal contribution of the lobby is therefore C( ; A) =
a[W (0; A) W ( ; A)]. The equilibrium is not necessarily unique, but only
two kinds may occur. This allows us to characterize the equilibrium as less-
distorted or more-distorted with respect to the case of no aid. When WA is
negative, the reaction function of the government is decreasing, though the
tangency point has to lie on the concave decreasing tract of the IFIs welfare
contour. This equilibrium would be characterized by a positive amount of
aid and by a small value of distortion  , lower than NA. IfW cA > 0 instead,
the equilibrium point ( ; A) has to lie on the increasing part of the IFIs
map of welfare countours thus leading to an equilibrium in which the level
of policy distortion is certainly higher. In order to understand the position
of the government I give the expression of its utility slope:
d
dA
(G)
=   aWA
aW + C
(2.22)
This is negative for lower  and positive for larger  . For low levels of the
distortion the marginal benet gained from the contribution is stronger than
the marginal depleament of the economic welfare, though the governments
utility does not vary as aid increases. When the distortion is larger, the
marginal contribution is not su¢ cient to compensate for the worsening of
economic performance and, in order to maintain the same level of utility, the
government needs to receive larger amounts of aid. As it can be seen in Figure
2, in each kind of equilibrium the government is better o¤. It reaches a higher
54 CHAPTER 2. INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
indi¤erence curve (GE) with respect to the case of no aid (G0). Is it possible
to draw similar conclusions in terms of aggregate welfare? Economic welfare
positively depends on aid and negatively depends on distortions. Hence it
can be drawn as an increasing curve24. Certainly, for WA < 0 the overall
welfare increases, but the result is not obvious if we end up in more distorted
equilibrium.
UAtUAtNAt NAt
A(t )
t t
A*
0>AWt 0<AWt
A*
G0
GE GE
IE
IE
A(t  )
G0
Figure 2: Internal political equilibrium with unconditional aid
When aid is fungible, which is likely when it is not conditional on specic
policies, its role in reducing the cost of the distortion on aggregate welfare
can lead the economy to a worse policy environment. Furthermore, although
the "good equilibrium" is associated to a level of welfare above the equilib-
rium with no foreign assistance, this is not necessarily the case in the "bad
equilibrium" since both aid and distortion have increased. This produces op-
posite e¤ects on economic welfare. In Appendix 2 we show how the chance of
appropriating some aid by the lobby group has a non trivial positive e¤ect on
the equilibrium outcome and might drive economy from the more distorted
equilibrium to the more favorable one, despite of the positive cross marginal
e¤ect of aid. The complementarity e¤ect between aid and distortions is
reduced when they become substitutes inside the lobbys utility function.
24Its slope is given by ddA
(W )
=  WAW > 0. An example is drawn in Figure 2.
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2.5 Internal political equilibrium in the pres-
ence of conditional aid
Conditionality of foreign assistance has been the topic of an important de-
bate over the aid implementation strategies by all multilateral donor agencies.
Since the role of proper economic reforms has been considered a core requi-
site to enhance economic growth the idea of conditioning aid giving to the
implementation of specic policy changes has been pursued.
I now consider the case when aid is conditional on the distortion. The
framework comes to a common agency game in which two principals, the
IFI and the special interest group wish to condition the governments policy
choice. At the beginning of the game the IFI and the lobby simultaneously
o¤er an assistance and a contribution schedule to the political authorities.
That reduces the timing of the game to two periods. In the second and
nal stage the government sets the degree of distortion, after obseving both
the payment schedules aimed at a¤ecting its decisions in the opposite sense.
Their objectives are in fact not allied. While the lobby, exactly as in the
previous section, benets from an increase of the distortion, the IFI o¤ers
assistance to obtain a lower level of it. Grossman and Helpmans work we
have been referring up to now was specically targeted to a common agency
situation. In order to characterize the equilibrium of the game we have to
adapt the aforementioned conditions to the presence of two principals.
The combination of the level of distortion, the assistance schedule and the
contribution schedule (CA; ACA; CCA) represents a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the non cooperative game with conditional aid if the following
conditions are respected.
Condition 1: both C and A are feasible.
Condition 2: CA = argmax aW ( ; ACA()) + CCA();   0
a[W +WAA ] + C = 0 (2.23)
Condition 3:CA = argmax aW ( ; ACA()) +CCA() +U() CCA();
  0
a[W +WAA ] + C + U   C = 0 (2.24)
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Condition 4:CA = argmax aW ( ; ACA()) + U()] + CCA()+
+ W ( ; ACA())  rACA();   0
a[W +WAA ] + C + [W +WAA ]  rAp = 0 (2.25)
Condition 5:9  0 and  00 that maximize aW ( ; A()) +C() : C( 0) = 0
and A( 00) = 0 ; respectively.
Condition 1adds the requirement for the payment schedule not to exceed
the available resources also to the aid donor agency. Conditions 2and 3
resemble the ones of the conditional case with the only di¤erence that now A
is not given, but a function of the distortion. Condition 4requires that also
the joint welfare of the government and the "new" principal, the IFI, has to
be maximized. If this condition were not satised together with 3the lobby
or the IFI could propose di¤erent schedules more benecial to their welfare.
Finally Condition 5 requires the existence of two levels of distortion for
which the governments objective function is maximized, when, alternatively,
one of the two payment schedules is null. This implies that the government
in such cases has to be as well o¤ as at the equilibrium level, otherwise there
would be space to modify its decisions over  and gain a larger welfare level.
The two principals, when xing their payment schedule, have now also to
consider the other principals optimal strategy. We have to verify both the
contribution schedule and the aid funding to be truthful. When conditions 2
and 3and 2and 4are satised at the same time, we obtain the expressions,
respectively, for a truthful contribution and a truthful assistance.
CCA = U (2.26)
ACA =  
W
WA   r (2.27)
Truthful contribution is always positive and rises with the level of distor-
tion at an increasing rate exactly in same fashion as the utility function of
the lobby. In practice, as stated in Grossman and Helpman (1994) the shape
of the contribution function mirrors the one of the utility function. Truthful
assistance instead potentially might both increase or decrease with the level
of distortion depending on the size of the marginal benet of aid on con-
sumerswelfare (that is incorporated in the IFIs objective function). The
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right side of (2.24) also represents the slope of the IFIs welfare contours in a
( ; A) plane. As the numerator is negative by denition the slope turns from
positive to negative from lower to higher values of A. The equation WA   r
implicitly denes the set of ( ; A) combinations where the sign of the slope
changes and also, when  = 0, the value of aid the IFI would disburse to
the government in the absence of any lobbying activity. When conditionality
issues are considered, the hypothesis of restricting the analysis to the case of
negative A seems reasonable, but the scope of the present work is to under-
line the possible reasons for proper incentives to be dismissed. We investigate
what changes might occur in equilibrium if this is the case. Substituting the
truthful paymentsexpressions into (2.20) gives
U =   arW
WA   r > 0 (2.28)
The equation yielding to the equilibrium expression is satised when the
IFIs welfare is maximized and when the joint welfare of the government and
the lobby group is maximized. Graphically this corresponds to the tangency
point of a IFIs welfare contour and a governments welfare contour (ob-
tained considering the truthful contribution of the lobby) in a (d;A) plane.
Governments contours slope is given by
dA
d
(G)
=  aW + U
aWA
(2.29)
which is negative for smaller values of  and positive for larger ones. The
equilibrium condition becomes
  W
WA   r =  
aW + U
aWA
(2.30)
which, solved for U , gives the expression in (2.28). If we restrict to the
case of donor agencies designing foreign assistance programs such that do-
mestic governments are forced to lower policy distortion (when [WA   r < 0
) a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can only occur on the decreasing part
of the governments welfare contour. Furthermore, as Condition 5has to
be respected, the equilibrium point lies on the governments welfare contour
passing for the value of distortion that maximizes its welfare when no aid is
given (named NA in section 1). This allows us to observe that the level of
distortion CA produced in the equilibrium with conditional aid is lower than
the one the internal political setting would reach in the absence of foreign
58 CHAPTER 2. INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS
assistance. This result holds also when the cross marginal e¤ect of aid to
policy distortion is positive. In this case the distortion will be smaller with
respect to the unconditional case, but we cannot be sure of this benet to
hold if the cross marginal e¤ect of aid is negative. Whether the distortion
in equilibrium results weaker will depend on the relative slope (in the neigh-
bourhood of the equilibrium) of the government policy reaction function of
the unconditional case and the one of the governments welfare function in
the conditional setting. The steeper one produces the more distorted equilib-
rium, not only in terms of d, but also of aid disbursed. Whatever the point
reached, the government will end up in a lower welfare curve with respect to
the case of aid disbursed without conditions. In general the government is
worse o¤ with respect to the unconditional case.
As before, comparing the IFIs welfare in the two cases leads to a clear re-
sult when aid is more e¤ective in reducing the negative impact of distortions
(WA > 0). By conditioning aid, the IFI reaches a utility curve closer to the
A   axis, that generates a larger welfare for her. When aid is less e¤ective
on the policy setting (WA < 0) we cannot draw an a priori conclusion. The
same reasoning applies when we try to compare the aggregate welfare of the
economy in the two circumstances.
In my opinion, it is worthy to notice that to obtain such an equilibrium
I had to assume the A() function to be negative in  , its shape did not
result from the equilibrium requirements. Potentially though, by relaxing the
hypothesis, another kind of equilibrium is possible. When we allow assistance
schedule to be positive (WA   r > 0) he occurrence of an equilibrium along
the increasing part of the governments welfare contour is possible. If such
an equilibrium exists the economy might still be characterized by a degree
of policy distortion superior to the one obtained when no aid is disbursed.
(See Figure 3(right)) Observe that when aid nancing is more costly for the
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IFI the possibility of more distorted equilibria to occur reduces.
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Figure 3: Internal political equilibrium with conditional aid
2.6 Conclusions
I developed a theoretical framework that allows to analyze the e¤ect of for-
eign aid in a country in which a special interest group actively attempts to
inuence the government policy decisions. The key assumption lies in aid
a¤ecting the welfare of the economy both directly and indirectly through
the policy. When aid is disbursed unconditionally with respect to the policy
implemented, the equilibrium outcome strictly depends on the way aid inter-
acts with the distortion. Aid literature has typically considered their cross
marginal e¤ect on welfare to be negative, especially relying on the results
by Burnside and Dollar(2000). In analyzing the aid-growth regression they
conclude that the relationship is positive only after including an aidpolicy
interaction term. The interaction term reveals a positive sign. Since their
variable was an index measuring "good policy" it would be associated to
a negative cross marginal e¤ect between the level of distortion and foreign
aid (W cA < 0) in the light of my analysis. This paper had a big impact
on multilateral donorsaid strategies, probably because these ndings were
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embodied in the 1998 World Bank Report about aid25. Later works demon-
strate the fragilities of the results26. My intent is to stress the possibility
for the opposite assumption to hold. Think of  ; for example, as a scal
distortion favouring some specic good producers (or also, as a suboptimally
implemented tax collection technology ). An increase in the distortion has a
negative e¤ect on public welfare, because the citizens su¤er from a decrease in
redistribution. The government cares about the population, but it is o¤ered
a contribution by the group of producers to implement a positive distortion.
In these circumstances, if the government also receives foreign assistance,
the cost of accepting the reform diminishes, because the resources derived
from aid allows the government to relax its budget constraint. Technically
this corresponds to having WA > 0: The resulting equilibrium distortion is
larger than the one obtained in the absence of aid. The economy ends up
in a more distorted equilibrium when foreign assistance is present. Larger
distortions yield to a decrease in the growth rate. Observe that whenever
aid is fungible, that is when the government is free to allocate the additional
resources according to its preferences27, the aforementioned situation is very
likely to occur. From a slightly di¤erent perspective, we can think of the
government as shared in two "souls". A benevolent stream pursues collective
welfare and addresses redistribution issues and bureaucrats are paid by the
rich to set lower taxes. Acemoglu et al.(2007) describe such a patronage po-
litical model in order to identify a possible determinant of the emergence and
persistence of ine¢ cient states. Fiscal implementation and collection require
the presence of bureaucrats. They show how the surge of an ine¢ cient state
structure can be pursued by the rich elite in order to reduce redistribution
and public good provision in newborn democracies. My analysis is coherent
with this kind of framework.
When we turn to conditionality it is possible to achieve a less distorted
equilibrium also in the case of positive marginal e¤ect of aid on distortions,
25For further details see "Assessing aid: what works, what doesnt and why", World
Bank Report, 1998.
26Easterly at al.(2004), on the American Economic Review, the same journal where "Aid,
policies and growth" was published, demonstrated that Burnside and Dollars ndings were
not robust to an extension of the sample and were strongly depending on the role of 5
outliers. Other critics came from Hansen and Tarp(2001) and Ram(2004).
27Fungibility does not necessarily implies that aid transfers are not targeted to specic
sectors. If the government has the chance to divert resources from the aid assisted sectors
to others, anyway foreign assistance simply translates into extra resources available to the
government.
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but it is not possible to exclude the occurance of bad equilibria completely.
As the International Financial Institution incorporates the welfare of the
country in its utility, in presence of very high distortions its committment
to conditionality might reveal weak. Remember that distortions negatively
a¤ect economic welfare at an increasing rate (W < 0). When the distor-
tion is high and the marginal benet of aid is larger than the marginal cost
of funding it, the IFI may prefer to increase aid as the distortion tends to
worsen. This occurs for low levels of aid, since foreign assistance, instead,
a¤ects economic welfare at a decreasing rate. When the cost of nancing aid
increases, the space for "bad" equilibria to occur reduces. In this sense, the
market interest rate r could as well be interpreted as an indirect measure of
condionality-enforcement potential. There is widespread evidence that the
conditionality of foreign assistance did not ultimately produce the expected
results on LDCs growth28. One of the reasons has been attributed to dis-
torted incentives on the donors side. Often multilateral institutions aid
programs are designed to realize a disbursement, notwithstanding the e¤ec-
tive compliance of imposed conditions. This happens because the monitor-
ing/evaluating phase is scarsely implemented or the agenciessta¤scarrier is
somehow more attached to the amount of disbursements than to the e¤ective
returns on them, This basically prevents coherent strategies to be pursued.
Broad and uninformed western public consensus over "something has to be
done for the poors" anyway might have strengthen these counterproductive
attitudes.
My considerations are also in line with the literature investigating the
causes of delay on reforms. Lobbies controlling natural resources buy the
government not to implement reforms that possibly undermine their vested
interests. Foreign assistance might deteriorate the policy setting when it
increases the governments payo¤, for any given level of distortion, because
it makes the government less sensitive to the costs of not implementing the
reforms.
2.7 Appendix 1: Aid repayment
28See Mosley(1985).
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Here I briey show how the results derived above vary when receiving foreign
assistance is costly for the recipient country. The rate of repayment on aid
disbursment equals . The market interest rate is r > 0. Economys net
welfare becomes:
W ( ; A; b) = a[W ( ; A)  1+
1+rA]
where b = [(1 + )=(1 + r)]. Typically international organization make
loans at favorable rates of interest. When  equals  1 aid represents a grant
and our assumption is that  1   < r , in this latter case aid becoming a
subsidized loan. I dene b the rate of repayment and simmetrically (1   b)
the rate of subsidizing by the IFI. The extent of the subsidy depends on
the prevailing market interest rate. The government accepts assistance only
when the marginal benet from aid exceeds its marginal cost (WA   b > 0).
The equilibrium conditions of the unconditional and the conditional case
become respectively
  aWA
aW + U
=  W
c
A   (b+ r)
W
(2.31)
  W
WA   (b+ r) =  
aW + U
a(WA   b) (2.32)
As I briey discussed before the results do not vary much. An increase in
b makes the equilibrium distortion lower for less-distorted equilibria ( when
WA < 0) and higher for more-distorted equilibria (when WA > 0) in the
unconditional framework. In the conditional case, since b diminishes the
slope of the governments welfare contours and increases the slope of the
IFIs welfare contours, it has a positive e¤ect on the equilibrium distortion.
The rate of repayment in general has the same e¤ect of the market interest
rate. Its presence amplies the e¤ect of r. It can be said that aid being
costly, from both the donors and the recipients side has a positive a¤ect on
the equilibrium distortion.
2.8 Appendix 2: Internal political equilib-
rium with aid expropriability
Considering the possibility for the special interest group to gain some positive
benet from foreign aid leads to non trivial di¤erences in the results obtained
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before. If we allow for lobbys utility to positively depend on aid directly,
as if the S.I.G. would be able to appropriate some of the resources deriving
from aid we end up facing an interesting situation.
Considering the variations of the hypothesis the model modies as follows
G( ; A) = aW ( ; A) + C() where U now depends also on A. L(A; ) =
U(A; )   C() As it was discussed above, marginal utility is increasing in
aid, which leads to UA > 0. The assumption is that UA < 0. Aid consti-
tutes an additional resource for the lobby, the returns on it will depend on
the technological features characterizing its activity function. We consider
decreasing return to scale as in the standard literature.
In the conditional case the tangency point between the governments wel-
fare contour and the IFIs utility curve is
 aWA + UA
aW + U
(G)
=  WA   r
W
(I)
(2.33)
When UA is low enough it can overcome the e¤ect of a positive WA:
The fact that the lobby is able to appropriate some benets from aid make
aid and distortions substitute within the lobbys utility function. This leads
to a lower distortion in equilibrium when aid and distortions are already
substitutes in the governments objective function (WA > 0).
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Chapter 3
Political constraints under
asymmetric information
3.1 Introduction
In order to complete the analysis I will extend the political framework of
the second chapter to a setting of asymmetric information. The benchmark
case has the same features as before. It is often di¢ cult for an International
nancial Institution to understand the real commitment of the governments
to public welfare enhancing policies and reforms. The same occurs domesti-
cally to the interest groups which wish to inuence the policy choices. The
governments might nd it convenient to hyde their preferences in order to
extract more resources. If the government is not seen as a unitary actor,
but as a "two-soul" entity in which both benevolent politicians and corrupt
bureaucrats are present, the relative weight of the two components might
be di¢ cult to detect from outside. The uncertainty over the governments
preferences is particularly high when we deal with neo-elected governments
for example. Initially I consider only the interaction between the government
and a special interest group within the country and I allow the government
to have private information over the relative weight it attaches to the pub-
lic welfare with respect to the one associated to the payment received by
the lobby (I name this weight as the "consensus parameter"). Considering
how the New Regulatory Economics literature deals with the problem of
policy inuence by special interest groups, informational asymmetries and
67
68CHAPTER 3. POLITICALCONSTRAINTS UNDERASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
the trade-o¤ between allocative ine¢ ciency and information rent extraction
are central issues. Monetary transfers can be used to reduce informational
conicts. In this perspective, the political power of a group is related to
its ability to gain some informational rent. In general the Incentive Theory
states that asymmetric information may produce some distortion towards
the ideal point of the informed party. In the single agent model before and
in the common agency model, once the international nancial institution is
introduced, the principals contribution has a double role. As in a standard
principal-agent model it serves as a political inuence instrument. In addi-
tion, it becomes the screening instrument to induce the government to reveal
its private information. Asymmetric information allows the government to
extract a positive information rent whatever its preferences are, except at
the top of the distribution. When the IFI enters the game the context is
one of conicting principals as the lobbys preferences towards the distortion
are opposite. While under complete information the competition between
the two principals drives to a less distorted equilibrium that if the lobby
was playing alone with the government, under asymmetric information the
equilibrium outcome is not always favorable to the international nancial
institution. The size of the uncertainty (the range of the distribution of the
"consensus parameter") plays an important role.
In section 2 I develop the model with a single principal and under com-
plete information. In section 3 the model is extended to asymmetric infor-
mation. Section 4 presents the common agency case, both under complete
and asymmetric information.
3.2 The model
The political setting is characterized by a government which has all the
policy decision power. Its reform choice, named  , assumes 0 value when it
is optimally implemented and a positive value when it produces a distortion.
The welfare of the political authorities depends negatively on the suboptimal
level of reform obtained and positively on a contribution received by a reform
adverse lobby group. This positive payment does not produce any e¤ects on
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the aggregate economy. It solely induces the government to opt for a distor-
tion. The typical principal-agent game that describes such a situation was
developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994)1 in the context of trade tari¤s
on import goods. Their results show that in equilibrium a certain distortion
is produced in return for a certain contribution. If the economy is marked
by only one group interested in trade protection the contribution results in
the minimum amount necessary to compensate the government from the de-
crease in general welfare caused by the distortion. When more lobbies are
competing each other to inuence the outcome of the policy the aggregate
contribution received by the government is larger. In the second chapter I
examined this setting in the presence of foreign aid. The aim of the present
work is to extend it to an asymmetric information context. The agents utility
is a linear combination of the aggregate economic welfare weighted for a pa-
rameter representing the governments preferences for the public welfare and
the contribution schedule o¤ered by the Special Interest Group (SIG). The
equilibrium distortion negatively depends on this parameter. I assume that
the "consensus parameter" is governments private information. The lobby
cannot observe a before o¤ering the contribution. Governments welfare is
given by
G( ; a) = aW () + C() (3.1)
where the aggregate welfare W () negatively depends on the level of
distortion  at an increasing rate (W < 0 and W < 0) and a is the
parameter identifying the attention to public consensus (or also the quality
of institutions ). The SIG does not observe the governments "ideological
type". It is drawn from  = [0; a]2, the continuum of values between 0 and
a strictly positive upper bound of a (a), according to a distribution (a)
and an associated density function (a) > 0. Economic welfare is maximized
when there is no distortion ( = 0). In order to identify an explicit solution
1Grossman and Helpman build their framework on the common agency model devel-
oped by Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
2The consensus parameter a = ( b1 b ), can be considered as the relative weight for the
public compared to the weight attached at the contribution in the governments utility.
We name b the weight associated to the public consensus and (1   b) the weight of the
contribution (where 0  b  1).
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to the problem, I dene it with the following function that satises the states
assumptions.
W () = (Z    2) (3.2)
The governments objective function becomes
G( ; a) = a(Z    2) + C() (3.3)
The lobbys utility, net of the contribution, is given by
L() = U()  C() (3.4)
where gross utility increases with the amount of distortion at a decreasing
rate (U > 0 and U < 0). I give an explicit function for U() too:
U() =  (  Q)2 (3.5)
Assumptions U > 0 and U < 0 hold when we restrict the set of
existence of  to [0; Q]: Lobbys net utility is
L() =  (  Q)2   C() (3.6)
Before allowing for asymmetric information, I characterize the equilibrium
outcome in the case of complete information3. The political authorities and
the lobby play a two stage non cooperative game in which the SIG acts rst,
3The results mirror the ones obtained in the previous chapter.
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o¤ering (and committing to) a contribution schedule that associates a certain
amount of payment to each suboptimal level of reform implemented. In the
second period, after observing the funding plan, the government chooses the
degree of reform to implement in order to maximize its objective function. As
in Grossman and Helpman (1994) I limit the analysis to truthful equilibria
that guarantee a reliable committment on the lobbys side. Moreover, as
the vested interest group does not face any competition in inuencing the
authorities, the contribution given exactly equals the di¤erence between the
governments utility when the reform is completely implemented (and the
lobby is not active) and the amount due to the suboptimal level reached
in equilibrium. The contribution is assumed to be feasible, that is it never
exceeds the total amount of resources of the lobby. Therefore, the distortion
driving to a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) comes from the
solution of the simultaneous maximizations of the objective function of the
government and of the coalition formed by the joint utility of the government
and the lobby4. When these conditions are both satised the contribution is
truthful, because the marginal cost of nancing the government equals the
marginal benet derived from an increase in the distortion. Solving the rst
order conditions gives
 2a + C = 0 (3.7)
 2a + C   2(  Q)  C = 0 (3.8)
from which we can dene the suboptimal level of reform occurring in
equilibrium as a function of the consensus parameter:
  =
Q
1 + a
(3.9)
The more benevolent is the government (the larger is a) towards the
general public the lower is the distortion. Parameter a is exogenous here.
4See Grossman and Helpman (1994) and the previous chapter for a detailed description
of the equilibrium conditions.
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On the contrary, the larger is the distortion desired by the lobby (Q), the
greater is the distortion in equilibrium.
The resulting contribution in equilibrium becomes C( ) = a( )2 
05. Observe that the contribution is strictly positive except for the cases in
which the distortion or the consensus parameter are null. When there is no
distortion the lobby has no incentive in giving payments to the government.
The same holds when the government has no interest at all in the public
welfare. In this latter case, the equilibrium distortion is the highest possible
(Q), but the result is not driven by the political inuence of the lobby. When
a "bad" government is in place the SIG potentially acquires its objective at
zero cost. Anyway, the equilibrium contribution rises as a increases6. The
lobby needs to contribute more to convince a more altruistic government to
implement a distortion.
3.3 Asymmetric information
Now I consider a situation in which the government knows its ideology pa-
rameter, while the vested interest group does not own such an information.
The problem can be examined as a Principal-Agent setting with asymmetric
information.
The lobby (principal) has to submit a payo¤ maximizing contract to the
political authorities who already possess a private information when con-
tracting takes place. The governments and the lobbys utilities functions are
respectively dened as
G( ; a) = aW () + C(a) = a
 
Z    2+ C(a) (3.10)
L() = U((a))  C(a) =  ((a) Q)2   C(a) (3.11)
5The equilibrium contribution is derived from aW ()+C() = aW (0) where W (0) is
the governments payo¤ obtained by the maximization in the absence of lobbying activity.
6Substituting the value of a derived from (3.9) in the equation of the equilibrium
contribution and calculating the rst derivative with respect to a yields @C= @a = [Q
2
(1 
a2)=(1 + a)4] > 0; for a < 1.
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The timing of the game is slightly di¤erent. In the rst stage the lobby
o¤ers a contract, based on the combination of a monetary contribution with
respect to each distortion value, to induce the government to reveal its con-
sensus preferences. In the last period the government decides the degree of
reform to implement. As the distortion is produced the contribution takes
place. The government is required to announce its type before the contract
is submitted. Perfect commitment of the lobby is assumed since the focus of
the analysis is on truthful equilibria. The SIG has to maximize its welfare
by o¤ering a contract ((a); CG(a); CL(a)). For a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(BNE) to be reached, it is necessary to implement an incentive e¢ cient choice
function f(a) = ((a); C(a))7 that gives the government an expected welfare
at least equal to its reservation utility, for each possible value of a: Thanks
to the Revelation Principle for BNE, the equilibrium induced by a choice
function that maps each possible governments ideology type into the levels
of distortion and contribution can be replicated by means of a direct revela-
tion mechanism that induces truth-telling. As a consequence, the principal
can limit the search of such choice functions to the set of Bayesian incentive
compatible (BIC) ones.
The lobbys original problem is to maximize its expected payo¤ with re-
spect to the choice function, subject to incentive compatibility and individual
rationality constraints. Incentive compatibility guarantees that truthtelling
is an optimal strategy for the government and individual rationality rep-
resents the participation constraint for the agent. The government has to
obtain at least the same utility it would get if it did not receive the contribu-
tion (G(a) = aZ)8, otherwise it does not accept to take part in the contract.
G(a) is the governments reservation utility.
max
f(a)=(d(a);CG(a);CL(a))
E[U((a))  CL(a)] (3.12)
s.t. f(a) BIC (3.13)
7By assumption here the same contribution function positevely enters the governments
objective function and negatively enters the lobbys utility function. When linear utility
functions are considered, this condition is su¢ cient for Bayeasian incentive compatibility
to hold.
8The value of the distortion that maximizes the governments objective function when
there is no contribution is  = 0.
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a(Z    2) + C()  aZ; for each a 2 [0; a] (3.14)
Dene the governments utility when it reveals its true preference a as
G1(a) = a(Z   (a)2) + C((a)). Moreover, as CG(a) = CL(a) the problem
can be restated as follows:
max
d(a);G1(a)
Z a
0
[ ((a) Q)2  G1(a) + a(Z   (a)2)](a)da (3.15)
s.t. (a) non increasing9 (3.16)
G1(a) = G1(0) +
R a
0
W ((s))ds (3.17a)
G1(a) = aZ (3.18)
where (3.16) and (3.17) are respectively the necessary and su¢ cient con-
dition for incentive compatibility to hold. The participation constraint, equa-
tion (3.18), binds in correspondence of the highest value of a10.
The solution to the constrained maximization gives the optimal value of
the distortion under asymmetric information:
 AI =
Q
1 + [a  1 (a)
(a)
]
(3.19)
The equilibrium distortion is a function of a and of its distribution. For
the IC necessary condition to hold we need to have @[1 (a)
(a)
]=@a < 011: In
order to identify an explicit solution I assume a uniform distribution of a
for which the above condition is always satised. This implies
10G1(0) = 0Z = 0 is less restrictive. When the binding constraint holds this is always
veried.
11In Appendix 1 I derive the above solution.
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 AI =
Q
1 + 2a  a a 
a
2
>
a  1
2
(3.20)
 AI = 0 otherwise (3.21)
Observe that imposing  AI < Q (the necessary condition to have a distor-
tion increasing utility for the lobby) is su¢ cient to allow for a non negative
 AI The distortion produced in equilibrium with asymmetric information is
higher than   except that for the upper bound value of the distribution.
When a = a; the distortion does not change with respect to the complete in-
formation solution. The distortion is the same when the government is purely
benevolent and an upward distortion is present whenever it is less altruistic.
The government derives a positive information rent whatever its preferences
over a are. The lobby succeeds in inducing truthtelling only for values of a
which are larger than the average size of the distribution. The intuition for
that lies in the fact that o¤ering a positive contribution to bad governments
may induce a good government to mimic less altruistic preferences. From
the governments participation constraint I derive the contribution o¤ered in
equilibrium:
CAI( AI) = (a  a)Z + a( AI)2 a >
a
2
(3.22)
CAI( AI) = 0 otherwise (3.23)
For each level of distortion the lobby has to contribute more to induce
the government to choose the same degree of distortion than if complete in-
formation were available. For each level of the consensus parameter of the
government, the higher is the uncertainty, the larger is the resulting con-
tribution. This explains the reason for which the equilibrium distortion is
increasing in a. Except for the case in which the government is purely benev-
olent (a = a), for any other value of its consensus parameter the government
obtains a positive information rent12 at the optimal contract. The marginal
12Information rent is dened as the the amount the agents utility exceeds its complete
information reservation utility. Here it is given by (a   a)Z: For a totally benevolent
government it is null, while for less altruistic governments it is always strictly positive.
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contribution with respect to a is negative13. The SIG has to design its o¤er
in such a way as to induce the government to reveal its true preferences for
the public welfare. The only way is to reduce the payment attached to higher
values of a. This result is opposite to the one observed under complete in-
formation, where the marginal contribution was increasing in the consensus
parameter.The government, unless being purely benevolent, obtains benets
from hyding its preferences before taking part in the contract, because it
acquires a positive information rent. Anyway the interaction between the
government and the special interest group is less welfare erosing under com-
plete information.
3.4 Conicting principals
Here I reintroduce the presence of an International Financial Institution of-
fering foreign assistance to the country in order to verify whether the results
obtained in the second chapter can be maintained when asymmetric infor-
mation is present. In this setting the government is a single agent who faces
two principals, the lobby and the IFI having conicting interests. The SIG
wishes to induce the implementation of a distortion as close as possible to its
desired level (Q14). The IFIs net utility instead is completely aligned to the
economic welfare of the country. In order to induce the government to pursue
the implementation of reforms it o¤ers an assistance schedule depending on
 . I address the case of conditional aid. The utility function of the lobby is
the same as before:
L() = U()  C() =  (  Q)2   C() (3.24)
The IFIs objective function here is given by
I() =W ()  A() = Z    2   A() (3.25)
13From the solution I can derive a as a function of AI . Substituting then in the
equilibrium contribution equation from (), I calculate @CAI=@a < 0 Note that the marginal
contribution is negative for any value of a.
14Note that, following previous assumptions, Q is also the largest possible distortion as
 2 [0; Q].
3.4. CONFLICTING PRINCIPALS 77
The government receives two payment schedules to be forced to divert its
policy decision in opposite directions.
G(a; ) = aW () + A() + C() = a(Z    2) + A() + C() (3.26)
The same assumptions about  and a are maintained:  2 [0; Q] and a is
uniformly distributed over a 2 [0; a].
3.4.1 Complete information
In order to identify a benchmark for comparison I rstly derive the equilib-
rium solution in the case of complete information.The problem reduces to a
common agency framework as the one I analyzed in Chapter 2. The only
di¤erence here is that both the principals payments enter linearly in the
governments objective function. The reason for that is technical. As this
case has to serve as a benchmark I wanted to keep the same functional forms
I use in the asymmetric information context. I discuss later the problems re-
lated to accomplish this analysis when dealing with the multiprincipal case.
A payment function entering nonlinearly in the welfare function would com-
plicate the treatment even more. The original underlying model to address
when solving common agency models is Bernheim and Whinston (1984). Fol-
lowing them, I derive the optimal distortion as the one maximizing at the
same time the payo¤ of the government and the joint aggregate utility of the
government and the principalsutilities. This yields to the following f.o.c.s:
 2a + A + C = 0 (3.27)
 2a   2   2(  Q) = 0 (3.28)
that lead to the following optimal distortion in the presence of an aid
nancing institution,
 A =
Q
2 + a
(3.29)
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Observe that the distortion outcome is lower than in the absence of aid.
The fact that the international donor is purely benevolent amplies the mar-
ginal e¤ect of the distortion on the aggregate welfare. The total payment
received by the government in equilibrium is higher. The total contribution
received by the government, when it accepts payments from both the prin-
cipals has to be C() + A()  a 2A 15 Each principals contribution has to
compensate the coalition formed by the government and the other principal
from what it gains from the equilibrium distortion compared to what it would
acquire absent the other principal. Otherwise, the government could decide
to accept the contribution only from one principal. The lobbys contribution
results in
C( A) = maxf0; (1 + a) 2A g (3.30)
and the IFIs assistance in
A( A) = f0; (1 + a)( 2A    2)  2Q( A    )g (3.31)
since the level of distortion that would be reached in equilibrium in case
aid were not accepted would be the one derived in the rst section,  . Note
that in equilibrium the aid disbursement is always positive16. The same oc-
curs for the lobbys contribution17. The lobby contributes more than when
15The equilibrium contribution is derived from the governments participation constraint
a(Z   2) +A() +C()  aZ. When only the lobby is present it has to guarantee to the
government a payo¤ at least equal to aZ. When only the IFI is present in equilibrium no
assistance is disbursed since its objective is completely aligned to the governments one.
Therefore the payo¤ obtained, absent the other principal, is still aZ:.
16If aid is not accepted by the government the equilibrium distortion is the one of the
single principal case . Foreign assistance, in order to be taken by the government,
has to leave the government and the lobby jointly as well o¤ as if aid were not given:
A(A) = a(Z 2)+C() (Q )2 C()  [a(Z 2A )+C(A) (Q A)2 C(A)]
Simplifying and substituting the equilibrium values for  and A we obtain A(

A) =
Q
2
=[(1 + a)(2 + a)2] which is always positive.
17Similarly, observing that when the lobby is not active the elicited distortion is 0, the
equilibrium contribution for the lobby is C(A) = aZ+A(0)+Z A(0) [a(Z 2A )+A(A)
+(Z   2A ) A(A):
Simplifying and substituting the equilibrium values for A leads to C(

A) = Q
2
(1 +
a)=(2 + a)2.
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acting alone only if the government is weakly benevolent. The marginal con-
tribution with respect to the consensus parameter in fact is always negative.
It mirrors the way the consensus parameter a¤ects the utility of the lobby. A
larger benevolence (high a) is associated to a lower distortion18 which leads
to a decrease in the lobbys utility. The marginal benet gained from the
distortion decreases as the distortion rises. Hence, considering truthful con-
tributions, also the size of the marginal contribution tends to decrease for
higher values of  (and a more benevolent government). The total amount
of payments received by the government in any case is higher than when
only the lobby is present. The competition between the IFI and the SIG to
inuence the distortion makes the government better o¤.
3.4.2 Asymmetric information over the governments
benevolence
Let us now assume that the importance given by the government to the public
welfare is its private information. Neither the lobby nor the International
Financial Institution know the value a takes for the government.
As discussed in the previous section, in agency settings with a single
principal, the principal problem can be restricted to the choice of a standard
direct mechanism, thanks to the revelation principle. In the case of multiple
principals, the agent has simultaneous information about the mechanisms
o¤ered by all the principals when he communicates with anyone of them. As
a consequence, any principal can design a mechanism in which the allocation
he selects can depend on the mechanisms that the other principals propose.
This leads to the risk of complicated regress strategies19. In order to over-
come the problem, Martimort and Stole (2002) observe that principals can
o¤er the agent a menu of contracts as an alternative. Moreover, Peters (2001)
demonstrates that in a single agent setting, for any set of indirect mecha-
nisms feasible for the mechanism designers and for any equilibrium relative
to that set, there is an equilibrium in menus that preserves the correspond-
ing equilibrium allocation. Martimor and Semenov (2006), building up on
the aforementioned results, recently treated the problem of asymmetric in-
formation in common agency policy models both as horizontal asymmetry,
18More precisely, larger values of a lead to an equilibrium distortion which is farther
from the lobbys desired level Q.
19See McAfee (1993).
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regarding the distance between the agents and the principalsdesired poli-
cies, and vertical asymmetry, concerning the weight given to social welfare,
which is consistent with the problem of my analysis. Following them, I set my
conicting principalss problem in order to analyze the equilibrium outcome.
Denote by G(a) the governments payo¤ when he accepts the payments
by both the lobby and the IFI and (a) the elicited distortion. The rent-
distortion prole {G(a); (a)} implemented by {C(); A()} satises
G(a) = [a(Z    2) + A() + C()] (3.32)
(a) = argmax
>0
a(Z    2) + A() + C() (3.33)
The maximization of the governments objective function20 (from equa-
tion (3.32) ) leads to the following f.o.c.
2a = A + C (3.34)
In the same way I dene fGL(a); L(a)g and fGI(a);  I(a)g the rent-
distortion proles associated respectively to the government accepting only
the lobbys contribution or the IFIs payment21:
GL(a) = [(Z    2) + C()] L(a) = argmax
>0
a(Z    2) + C()
(3.35)
GI(a) = [(Z    2) + A()]  I(a) = argmax
>0
a(Z    2) + A()
(3.36)
For a prole {G(a); (a)} to be implementable, following Lemma 1, pag.
9 in Martimor and Semenov (2006), it is su¢ cient to have
20The assumption of strict concavity of G(a) with respect to a will be veried ex-post.
Remember that W < 0 and W < 0.
21The assumptions of strict concavity and @(a)=@a < 0 must hold for these functions
too.
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G(a) and (a) almost everywhere di¤erentiable, with, at any di¤erentia-
bility point, @G(a)=@a = (Z   )2 and @=@a < 0.
The lobbys reaction function, for a given IFIs assistance A() is such
that the lobby maximizes its expected gross utility over the distribution of
a, subject to the standard incentive and participation constraints. We have
indeed
max
fG(a);(a)g
E[ (  Q)2   C()] (3.37)
s.t.  non increasing (3.38)
G(a) G(0) = R a
0
(Z   s)2ds (3.39)
G(a)  aZ; for each a (3.40)
Substituting C() from equation () into the maximand and calculating
the expected value yields to
max
fG(a);(a)g
Z a
0
[ (  Q)2  G(a) + (Z    2) + A()](a)da (3.41)
Similarly, the reaction function of the IFI is
max
fG(a);(a)g
E[Z    2   A()] (3.42)
s.t.  non increasing (3.43)
G(a) G(0) = R a
0
(Z   s)2ds (3.44)
G(a)  aZ; for each a (3.45)
that can be written as
max
fG(a);(a)g
Z a
0
[(Z   )2  G(a) + (Z    2) + C()](a)da (3.46)
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A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this common agency game under
asymmetric information is given by the combination of payments (C(); A ())
which implements a rent-distortion prole fG(a);  (a)g by solving the re-
action functions of both the principals.
The following f.o.c.s derive from the problem
 2(  Q) + A   2(2a  a) = 0 (3.47)
 2 + C   2(2a  a) = 0 (3.48)
From the governments payo¤maximization we know that A+C

 = 2a .
Summing up the rst order conditions this leads to the equilibrium distortion
under asymmetric information, in the presence of aid
 AAI =
Q
2 + 3a  2a a >
2a  1
3
>
2
3
(a  1) (3.49)
 AAI = 0 otherwise (3.50)
Firstly, note the simmetry with the single principal case. The distortion
 AAI is always larger than the one generated under complete information, 

A,
except at the top. When the government is purely benevolent (a = a) the
two solutions coincide. If the range of the distribution is very large (a > 1),
the rent prole of the government is associated to a positive distortion only
for the upper values of the consensus parameter.
The lobby has little incentive in o¤ering a contribution to a "bad" gov-
ernment. The rent prole is built in such a way as to remunerate only a
more reform prone government. This screening device allows to avoid "bad"
governments receiving higher contribution to implement the same level of
distortion they would have chosen in line with their preferences. From the
IFIs perspective instead, observe that, less altruistic governments tend to
induce a worse distortion environment. The IFIs objective is totally aligned
to the welfare of the country. Its role in a sense results in contrasting the ac-
tion of the lobby. When the government is not benevolent the utility gained
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from giving assistance falls, because, everything else equal, the equilibrium
distortion will be larger.
The marginal payments of the two principals are not equal. The marginal
contribution (in absolute value) of the lobby is always larger22. This is due
to the fact that the di¤erence between its desired distortion23 and the opti-
mal distortion the government would choose in absence of its contribution
is larger than the di¤erence between the IFIs and the governments optimal
distortions24.
Secondly, it is interesting to compare the equilibrium distortion under
asymmetric information of the single and the multiple principal settings.
When the range of uncertainty over the "consensus parameter" is low
enough (a < 1) the presence of the international nancial institution allows
for a lower distortion in equilibrium ( AAI < 

AI). The competition between
the conicting principals produces an improvement on the economic welfare.
However, if uncertainty increases (a > 1) this result is maintained only
when the government has a great interest in the public welfare (a > (a  
1)). Otherwise, foreign aid makes things worse. Observe that, while in
the single principal case, the value of the consensus parameter represents the
relative weight attached to the overall welfare compared to the one associated
to the lobbys contribution, in the common agency setting, since the IFI
shares the governments objective in terms of welfare, the implicit weight
associated to the total payments hides a welfare-prone component. When
only the lobby is active an a = 1 means that the government gives the same
weight to the economic performance of the country and to the contribution
received. In the game involving the IFI, the same value of a underesteems the
importance attached to the economic welfare. In this sense the case of a < 1
is less restrictive in this framework. However, the assumption of a major
importance given to public welfare seems more reasonable, in particular since
I consider the inuence of only one interest group. In Table 3.1 I report the
equilibrium outcomes of all the analyzed cases under this hypothesis.
The reservation utility of the government is the same, absent each of
the two principals. When there is no aid, the lobby has to compensate
the government from the increase in the distortion by making him as well
o¤ as without the contribution. When the lobby is not active, the IFI in
22By expressing the equation of the equilibrium distortion in terms of a and substituting
it in the respective f.o.c.s , we can derive the marginal payments in terms of a.
23The level of distortion that maximizes its utility is (Q).
24The optimal distortion of the IFI and the government coincide.
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equilibrium does not give any assistance, because the government already
pursues a zero optimal distortion. Each principal, anyway, in order not to be
excluded from the game, has to contribute enough to leave the joint utility of
the government and the other principal unchanged with respect to the case of
its absence. The equilibrium payments in Table 3.1 are obtained in a similar
fashion under complete and asymmetric information, but in the latter case
the expected values have to be considered. This leads to the contribution
depending on the upper bound of the distribution of the consensus parameter,
a. The results resemble the ones obtained in Chapter 2. Here anyway, I
explicitly addressed conditionality, as the assistance schedule A() depends
on the level of distortion implemented. I individuated, though, an additional
channel through which aid can potentially induce more distorted equilibria,
even in the presence of conditionality. In this case, what drives to the "bad
equilibrium" is the wide uncertainty over the governments preferences.
Complete information Asymmetric information
1 Pr.   = Q
1+a
(++)  AI =
Q
1+2a a ; a >
a 1
2
(+++)
C( ) = a( )2 C( AI) = (a  a)Z + a( AI)2
2 Pr.s  A =
Q
2+a
(+)  AAI =
Q
2+3a 2a ; a >
2
3
(a   1)
(++++)
C( A) = (1 + a)(

A)
2 C( AAI) = E[(1 + a)(

AAI)
2]
A( A) = (1 + a)(

A
2    I2)  
2Q( A    I)
A( A) = E[(1+a)(

AAI
2 L2) 
2Q( AAI   L)]
Table 3:1 Equilibrium outcomes in the presence of high uncertainty over the governments preferences (a>1)
3.5 Conclusion
It is often the case that governments preferences towards collective welfare
are not common knowledge to the other agents of the economy. I analyzed
how a political setting characterized by the presence of a special interest
group is inuenced by this kind of asymmetric information. The lobby tries
to "buy" the government in order to a¤ect its policy decisions, but it does
not know to what extent the government weights public welfare with respect
to the contribution o¤ered. Asymmetric information in the internal political
game leads to a larger distortion in equilibrium compared to the complete
information setting when the government is highly altruistic. Only in the
3.5. CONCLUSION 85
extreme case of a completely benevolent government (when the consensus
parameter a coincides with the upper value of its distribution, a) the level
of distortion under complete and asymmetric information is the same. In
this framework the lobby constructs a contract that associates to any level of
the consensus parameter (a) a given contribution. For not enough altruistic
governments (a < (a 1)=2), however, the lobby does not succeed in pushing
the government to reveal its true preferences. Low levels of the consensus
parameter leads to higher degrees of distortion. If positive contributions
were "promised" to a "bad" government, this would have the incentive to
mimic more altruistic preferences in order to obtain a larger contribution to
implement the same degree of distortion it would have chosen anyway. Hence
,in order to induce the government to reveal its true preferences, low levels
of the consensus parameters have to be associated to a null contribution.
The simple Principal-Agent framework is then complicated by consider-
ing the presence of an International Financial Institution which gives aid to
the government with a benevolent purpose. The multiple agent setting can-
not be analyzed anymore by relying on the revelation principle instrument.
Both the lobby and the IFI make payments to the government with opposite
objectives over the degree of distortion to implement. They o¤er a menu of
contracts to the government that is designed taking into account both the
government objective function and the payo¤s obtainable by the alternative
decision of playing with only one principal. With complete information aid
makes the policy environment better. The distortion produced in equilib-
rium is lower than the one implemented when only the lobby is active. Aid
here is considered conditional on policies since the IFIs payment function
depends on the degree of distortion. Under asymmetric information instead
the equilibrium distortion is larger25. There is also the risk of ending up to a
more distorted equilibrium with respect to the the single-principal case un-
der asymmetric information. In particular this occurs when the uncertainty
over the consensus parameter is high (a > 1) and the government is not very
altruistic (a < (a  1)). Otherwise the standard results of an improvement
in the policy outcome due to the competition of conicting principals still
take place.
There is a variety of situations in which the preferences of the government
25As for the single-principal case only in the extreme case of the consensus parameter
being equal to the upper value of its distribution the equilibrium distortions of the complete
and asymmetric information cases coincide.
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are perceived as highly uncertain. Unstable governments, for instance, are
typically less reliable. Their line of conduct is very volatile. This induces
di¢ culties in forecasting their consensus preferences. Recently elected gov-
ernments, especially in the context of a regime change, might accomplish the
objectives declared during their electoral campaign (or rise to the power) or
might not. Along the course of the analysis I have taken the consensus pa-
rameter a as exogenous. Starting to think on what factors it might depend
on, government reputation and previous commitments would certainly lie on
top of the list.
Here I extended the setting considered in the second chapter to asymmet-
ric information.The analysis leads to identify an additional channel through
which aid potentially induces more distorted equilibria in the recipient coun-
tryeconomy. Moreover, the kind of assistance I refer to is conditional aid.
From an analytical point of view, aid simply sums up to public welfare in-
side the governments objective function. In practice, the e¤ectiveness of
foreign assistance considered in this model is limited to the aid e¤ect on
welfare through policies. I isolated the direct impact of assistance on the
economic welfare of the country from its indirect e¤ect and I considered only
the latter one. The results strongly depend on the volatility of the govern-
ments preferences. This specic factor has not yet been considered in the
Aid E¤ectiveness Literature, but it might play a role in explaining why the
aid-policy interaction term of growth regressions is not signicant in some
specications. These empirical studies use cross-country regressions and pol-
icy indexes. Country specic e¤ects are generally taken into account only
by means of the initial GDP of the country and regional dummy variables.
Further research on the topic deserves proper attention.
3.6 Appendix
Here I derive the solution of the lobbys maximization problem in section
3. From the IC su¢ cient condition, I substitute G1(a) into the maximand
obtaining
max
d(a);G1(a)
Z a
0
[ ((a) Q)2  G1(0) 
R a
0
W ((s))ds+ a(Z   (a)2)](a)da
(3.51)
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Integrating by parts we get
max
d(a);G1(a)
Z a
0
f[ ((a) Q)2 G1(0)+[a 1  (a)
(a)
](Z (a)2)g(a)da (3.52)
For the uniform distribution the hazard rate property necessary to guar-
antee that the concavity condition is always satised (@[1 (a)
(a)
]=@a < 0) ,
having (a) = a=a and (a) = 1=a. Observing that G1(0) = 0, and optimiz-
ing pointwise leads to the following f.o.c.26:
 2((a) Q)  2(2a  a)(a) = 0 (3.53)
that leads to the equilibrium distortion equation AI .
26Note that @(a)=@a < 0 guarantees that @W ((a))=@a > 0 ( as W < 0) as requested
by IC su¢ cient condition ().
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